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VII. CONCLUSION: COMMODIFICATION OF RELIGION
In recent years, the number of countries in which a dominant church
receives state aid and other forms of preferential treatment has increased.
Dominant religions and their supporters in the former Soviet bloc and
elsewhere often argue that special benefits and protection are warranted
based upon the unique history and contribution of the dominant church to
the identity, history, and culture of the country, and the interests of the state
and its citizens. Because of the distinctive status of religion and its
importance to national and cultural identity, special protection, especially
against foreign and other outside influence, is deemed necessary. Although
the spiritual realm is putatively treated as being a special situation
requiring special protection, the arguments in favor of religious protection
bear a curious resemblance to arguments in favor of protection made by
monopolists and other protected industries in the economic sphere. This
article compares the arguments in favor of protection made by dominant
religious groups with arguments in favor of protection by monopolists and
protected industries, and concludes that in their pleas for special treatment,
religious monopolists make arguments that closely parallel the arguments
made by their economic counterparts. Rather than resulting in religion
being treated as unique and different, protectionist arguments result in
religion being treated much like any other market commodity. We conclude
that because religious freedom is a fundamental human right, arguments
promoting state protection of dominant religions should be viewed with
suspicion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Religious monopolies in various countries have claimed that they should
receive state protections,1 often citing their unique cultural and historical
importance. As appealing as these arguments may be, upon inspection the
arguments these groups make to secure and support their financial and legal
privileges closely parallel the arguments used by industrial monopolies.
States protect religious monopolies through elevated status in the public
realm, 2 constitutional protection,3 financial assistance, 4 and by enacting
unfriendly laws towards minority religions.' In fact, some data suggests that
1. The term "religious monopoly" and "industrial monopoly" used throughout this article refer
to dominant religions or industries that receive state protection provided to such industry or religion
that limits foreign and domestic competition through financial aid, subsidies, tariffs, quotas, non-
tariff barriers, and legislative provisions that discourage competition (i.e. religious registration laws,
anti-cult legislation, criminal punishment for minority religious speech, and anti-proselytizing
provisions in the religious arena).
2. Robert Schott, State and Church in Sweden, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 295, 301 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1996) [hereinafter STATE AND CHURCH] (pointing out that
the government of Sweden has allowed the Church of Sweden to levy a "parochial tax" through the
state tax system); see generally STATE AND CHURCH (describing heightened privileges for dominant
religions in, among others, Spain, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Denmark, Austria,
Portugal, and Finland).
3. The Greek Orthodox Church is recognized in the 1975 Greek Constitution as being "the
prevailing religion in Greece." GREECE CONST. art. 3, 1 (1975). Islam is recognized as the state
religion in Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar,
and Tunisia. U.S. Dep't of State, International Religious Freedom Report (2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
4. Many states provide large subsidies and indirect aid for dominant religions. John T.S.
Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality, in CHURCH
AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: THE CHIMERA OF NEUTRALITY 13 T.2 (John T.S. Madeley
& Zsolt Enyedi eds., 2003) [hereinafter CHURCH AND STATE] (noting that, in 1980, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, and Switzerland received large state subsidies and that Andorra, Portugal, the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Malta received indirect state aid for religious organizations).
5. Bill Kissane, The Illusion of State Neutrality in a Secularizing Ireland, in CHURCH AND
STATE, supra note 4, at 73, 76 (describing that Irish "legislation on divorce, contraception and
freedom of expression had already been brought into line with Catholic teaching" as well as that "the
state's Censorship of Publications Board was usually chaired by a priest"); see also George Th.
Mavrogordatos, Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case, in CHURCH AND STATE, supra note
4, at 117, 120 (describing the rejection by the Greek Parliament to separate church and state in the
2001 constitutional revision); John Anderson, Catholicism and Democratic Consolidation in Spain
and Poland, in CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 4, at 137, 140 (describing the assertion of the
Catholic church that "phrasing on issues such as religious education, divorce, and abortion" should
not give "offence to the religious sensibilities of the Catholic population").
In addition, dominant religions receive special privileges and influence legislation controlling
whether competing religions can build worship houses or proselyte in a certain state.
Mavrogordatos, supra, at 121 (explaining that Greek Orthodox clergy now obtain "productivity
bonus[es]" from the state emphasizing the "unquestioned acceptance of the church's status as a
special branch of the state and of its civil service") (internal quotations omitted). Mavrogordatos
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the number of European states providing state aid to religious groups has
increased in recent years. 6 Typically, religious monopolies argue that state
protection serves three distinct sets of interests: the religion itself, the state
and society, and citizens.7 Religious monopolies argue that protection is
necessary to preserve a church because the church is in its infancy, or in a
stage of recovery, and needs financial assistance to maintain its presence and
to compete with heavily funded foreign churches.8 The claimed benefits to
the state include that the religion is fundamental to state culture, creates
social stability, preserves national identity and national security, and
prevents domestic dependence on foreign churches.9 Religious monopolies
also argue that state protection benefits the citizens who retain access to their
historical church of preference and avoid exploitation by new religions
through fraud and manipulation.' ° Religious monopolies in numerous
countries receive state protection, including financial aid and protectionist
legislation against competing religions, by relying on such rationales."
Arguments by monopolists in justification of their favored treatment and
protection are even more familiar in the economic realm. Industrial
monopolists make remarkably similar arguments about benefits that accrue
to the state, industry, and citizens in order to obtain subsidies and legislation
to protect their industries against domestic and foreign competition.
2
Varying degrees of state protectionism exist ranging from state-
regulated industries to protection of infant and recovering industries.' 3 This
also describes that currently "construction of any religious building still requires the permission of
the local Orthodox bishop," resulting in a lack of Muslim mosques anywhere in Greece except
Thrace and Attica. Id. The Greek Orthodox Church brought about legislation to prohibit
"proselytism and blasphemy" as "criminal offences with respect to any recognised religion." Id. at
122.
Even dominant religions that do not explicitly admit that they seek privileges from the state
may insist that the state "bear in mind and respect the real life of the people [and not] ignore the fact
that a large majority" of citizens belong to their church. Anderson, supra, at 140 (quoting a 1975
statement by a Catholic cardinal in Spain).
6. Madeley, supra note 4, at 16 T.3 (pointing out that Monaco, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Andorra, Portugal, Britain,
Italy, Malta, Armenia, and Poland now provide limited state subsidies to churches).
7. Of course, protectionist arguments also affect would-be competitors of religions, but these
arguments are beyond the scope of this article. In addition, sometimes politicians and other state
figures, rather than the dominant religion, make the arguments in favor of protection of a dominant
religion.
8. See generally infra Part II-A-2.
9. See generally infra Part II.
10. See generally infra Part IV-B.
11. See generally infra Part IV-B-2. Of course, we do not argue that these are the sole
justifications or explanations for state protection of religion. There are clearly deeper dynamics at
play with dominant religions, such as the fact that dominant religions are spiritually appalled by the
doctrines of proselytizing religions. In addition, in this discussion we do not explore the possible
explanations for the close relationship between dominant religions and their state, such as political
and financial corruption.
12. Id.
13. The most extreme form of state-regulated industry results in a public monopoly. A legal (or
public) monopoly is defined as "[tihe exclusive right granted by government to business to provide
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article discusses a variety of protectionist practices including subsidies,
tariffs, and legislation limiting foreign and domestic competition. These
practices result in various levels of state protectionism (whether consisting
of a combination of protectionist practices or an individual protectionist
practice in an extreme form) which may be harmful to industry, the state and
society, and citizens. As with industrial protection, religious protection
exists along a spectrum, with some religious monopolies benefiting from
many forms of state protection as a "virtual 'territorial monopoly[,]' 14 while
in other states, despite protection, minority religions survive. While several
commentators have explored the state of dominant religions in various
countries and the challenges facing minority religions, no commentator has
documented the remarkable similarity of the rationales for protection of
religious and industrial monopolies. A few scholars have applied economic
theories to questions of religious belief or government regulation of
religion,15 but none has explored the relationship of religious protectionism
and economic protectionism. This article examines the similarities in
protectionist arguments made in the industrial and religious arenas and
utility services that are, in turn, regulated by the government." BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 1023
(7th ed. 1999). An example of a public monopoly is the AT&T monopoly.
14. See Ralph Della Cava, Transnational Religions: The Roman Catholic Church in Brazil & the
Orthodox Church in Russia, 62 SoC. RELIG. 535 (2001), available at 2001 WL 20525099 (referring
to the Russian Orthodox Church as a monopoly enabled by foreign registration law enacted by the
state and the cooperation of local officials); see also W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lauren B. Homer,
Russia's 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Appraisal
3, available at http:/www.law.emory.edulEILR/volumeswin98/durhom.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2005) (noting that the "proponents of the [1997] Law" claim that the legislation was a "practical
concern" with laws that made it "all and sundry to establish a religion in Russia and then claim tax
exemptions"). However, legislation that "requires all organizations to re-register, and that will
operate in many cases to impose a retroactive fifteen-year limitation on the right of many religious
associations to maintain or attain full legal entity status, is obviously an overreaction to the reality
that some groups may have abused tax exempt status." Durham & Homer, supra.
Iran, unlike many of the other countries discussed, protects Islam as "the official religion of
[the country]" in its constitution. 2004 Annual Report of the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom 85, May 2004, available at http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/
l2May04/finalReport.php3 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). Not only is Iran virtually a religious
monopoly, but the government upholds only its own interpretation of Islam. Id.
The establishment of dominant religions comes "about as an evolution, rather than through a
revolution." E. Kenneth Stegeby, An Analysis of the Impending Disestablishment of the Church of
Sweden, 1999 BYU L. REV. 703, 767. Establishing protection of a dominant religion is a process
requiring several elements discussed above, including: state financial aid and protective legislation
from domestic and foreign competition. RAVI BATRA, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE 5, 187-90 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Eli Berman, Hamas, Taliban, and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View
of Radical Religious Militias, NBER Working Paper No. w10004 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wlO004 (last visited Jan. 24, 2005); Eric A. Posner, The Legal
Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEGAL THEORY 33 (1996); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV 1 (1989); see also
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 701 (June
1996).
asserts that when protectionist arguments are made to protect religious
monopolies, religion is treated as a market commodity.1 6
Modern protectionist arguments in the industrial field often rely solely
on economic efficiency theories, which seem to have no relevance to
arguments for religious policy. Indeed, United States industries seeking to
defend state protectionism must legally rely on market efficiency arguments
since current antitrust law relies solely on an efficiency-based economic
rationale rather than on social and political principles.
In spite of these contemporary trends and practices, we suggest that
there is a significant correlation between economic and religious
protectionist arguments. We also contend that protectionist arguments in the
field of religion ultimately treat religion as no more than an economic
commodity. For example, early defenders of U.S. antitrust laws argued that
monopolies, which benefit from extreme state protection, 7  permit
concentrations of power that decrease democracy and individual liberty.
Since religious freedom is a vital human right, arguments promoting state
protection of religion should be viewed with suspicion. This article asserts
that despite arguments by both industries and religions that they benefit from
state protection, lessons from industry and religion suggest that protection
rarely creates the advantages sought. In fact, the interests of the state,
industry, and citizens may actually be harmed, rather than served, by
protection. 18
Our argument will proceed as follows. In Part II, this article
summarizes the asserted benefits to an industry of state protection. It then
notes the remarkable resemblance of arguments in favor of protection of
religion with arguments to protect industry. Part III explores the claimed
benefits to the state and to society of protecting industry and compares these
with the asserted benefits to the state and to society of protecting a favored
religious group. Part IV explains the claimed benefits of protection of
industry to citizens, marking the resemblance between the claimed benefits
to citizens of protecting religion with the claimed benefits of protecting
industry. Part V recognizes that the stakes in religious protectionism are
particularly high, which results in additional claimed benefits to citizens.
Part V also casts doubt on the benefits of state protection and points out that
protection does not in the final analysis serve the interests of the industry or
16. Although the concern with competition is usually associated with industry, it is also a
concern shared by religious leaders vying for state protection and adds further cause for this
comparison. See infra Part II-B for further discussion.
17. Extreme state protection may result in a monopoly. Internal enterprises may assert pressure
on a state to allow it to achieve a monopoly. One example is a public monopoly, which is a state-
regulated and sanctioned monopoly. See supra note 13 for definition. Public monopolies are
justified under a "natural monopoly" rationale that asserts that in some industries the cost and
barriers of entry are just too high for there to be free competition which allows more than one entity
to compete. These types of monopolies more successfully gain state protection through financial aid
and legislation.
18. In examining the similarities between industrial and religious arguments in favor of
protection, we are not concerned with economic efficiency arguments, but point out that the social
and political motivations to oppose state protection apply equally to religion.
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religion, the state and society, or citizens. This section emphasizes that state
protection may actually harm an industry or religion by creating inefficiency
and poor service in the industrial arena and possibly creating oppressive
religions; harm society by increasing the concentration of power and
decreasing democracy and possibly inciting violence among religious
minorities; and harm citizens through decreasing individual liberty and
human rights. Part VI considers the acute interests religious monopolies
assert in order to gain state protection. Part VII provides a brief conclusion.
II. ASSERTED BENEFITS OF STATE PROTECTION TO AN INDUSTRY OR
RELIGION
There are a variety of reasons why a particular industry claims it needs
special protection. The basic concern is usually with domestic and
especially foreign competition. The first type of argument is the "infant"
and "dying" industries argument, which insists that a fledgling or struggling
industry needs state protection to grow until it is competitive. Dominant
religions also rely on this argument to obtain state financial aid and
protectionist legislation for fledgling or struggling churches. A second
argument is that protection against foreign and domestic competition,
including tariffs, subsidies, and non-tariff barriers, is necessary to prevent
foreign domination and control. Powerful religious groups similarly insist
upon protection against foreign competition through non-tariff barriers
(including foreign religious registration laws) and protectionist legislation
(including anti-proselytism laws).
A. Infant Industry and Dying Industry Arguments
Both industries and religions benefiting from protection often assert
infant industry arguments to obtain state financial aid and protectionist
legislation for a fledgling or struggling church or industry.
1. Industry
Infant industry protection' 9 has been used by various countries, in
20international conventions, and even to justify outcomes in certain cases.
19. In referring to "infant industry" protection this term also encompasses "dying industry" or
"recovering industry" protection since the three arguments are similar enough for the purposes of
this article.
20. The Warsaw Convention (officially called the "Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air") "emerged due to differences among the
world's countries as to liability rules governing air transportation accidents." Tory A. Weigand,
Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances Under the Warsaw Convention, 16 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 891, 892 (2001). The parties felt that a carrier's liability should be limited since liability
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Infant industries "are those that are unable to withstand foreign competition
without some form of protection by the government, but that with time could
grow and compete successfully in the global market."'21 Infant industries are
protected through government increases in the "domestic prices of imported
goods to enable domestic producers which are uncompetitive... in the
short-run to stay in business ....
In the United States, infant industry protection was supported by some
influential founding fathers as well as recently through congressional
legislation. Alexander Hamilton supported tariffs and subsidies to protect
infant industries of the early colonies. 23  After World War I, tariffs were
imposed on imports because Congress "believed that American businesses,
which had expanded into new markets as a result of the war, needed
protection as infant industries from foreign competition. '24 Some of these
tariffs are still in place today against certain nations.25  During difficult
economic times, President Reagan proposed that Congress amend the
Clayton Act to "exempt[] import-injured industries from the anti-merger law
for up to five years. 26  Even more recently, "[t]he Communications
Decency Act of 1996 was.., enacted to protect the infant industry of
Internet service providers. 27
may "threaten the financial security of the infant industry." Id. The "infant industry" was the
"fledgling international transportation business." Id.; see also Warsaw Convention, 49 U.S.C. §
40105 (1994); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (taking
into account that the television equipment manufacturer was an infant industry in deciding that
manufacturer did not violate antitrust laws).
21. Ruth L. Okediji, Trading Posts in Cyberspace: Information Markets and the Construction of
Proprietary Rights, 44 B.C. L. REv. 545, 567-68 (2003).
22. Jeffrey K.D. Au, Note, The Hopes and Fears of Foreign Direct Investment: A Comparative
Evaluation of FDI Regulation in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, 2 J. CHINESE L. 359,
380 n,121 (1988) (noting that "import substitution" strategies like "infant industry" protection are
one way of gaining monopoly profits). Infant industry protection also aims to "encourag[e] other
domestic producers to enter the [particular] market." Id. at 380 n.121.
23. See generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on the Subject of Manufactures, in 10 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230-340 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966). However, there is some
indication that Alexander Hamilton preferred subsidies to tariffs. Id.
24. Melissa Ann Miller, Note, Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Chile's Accession to the NAFTA
and the Fast-Track Debate, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 153, 158 n.37 (1996) (noting that after the war tariffs
were increased on "more than one-thousand articles in trade" including "minerals, chemicals, dyes
and textiles").
25. Id. Nations that do not have "Most Favored Nation" status with the United States are still
subject to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which applied tariffs on most imported articles after World
War I. Id. Congress has shown some regret after public condemnation for passing the Smoot-
Hawley Act, which some commentators say helped cause the Great Depression. Id. at 158; see also
Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J.
471,475 (1990) (discussing Congress's embarrassment due to the Smoot-Hawley Act).
26. William F. Shughart II et al., Antitrust Enforcement and Foreign Competition, in THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST 179 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart 1I
eds., 1995) (citing Nadine Cohodas, Reagan Seeks Relaxation of Antitrust Laws, 44 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 187 (1986)).
27. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil
Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 97 (2002) (also noting that
America Online, CompuServe and Prodigy were three Internet service providers intended to be
protected by the Communications Decency Act of 1996).
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Western European countries have been known to limit antitrust
enforcement and even encourage formation of cartels with "dying"
industries in times of slow economic growth and rising unemployment.28
For instance, many European state-run airlines have been supported by
government subsidies.2 9 In 1994, France proposed $3.7 billion in subsidies
to Air France, Greece proposed $1 billion to forgive Olympic Airways' debt,
and Portugal approved $1.1 billion in government aid to TAP Air Portugal.3°
These proposals were intended to save dying industries and, as an American
Airlines' government affairs director commented, "will have made it
impossible for an [EU] carrier to go out of business."'3' In the United States
after World War I, shipping was considered a "sick" industry and subsidies
were maintained despite government investigations that subsidy money was
used to fund excessive salaries and lobbying fees rather than to "stimulate
new construction or modernization., 32 Despite "scandals, though, President
Franklin Roosevelt insisted that... [s]ubsidization" would continue.33
Despite the claimed benefits of infant industry protection, which
arguably include increased domestic employment and industry,34 it is an
anticompetitive practice that favors a certain domestic industry.
2. Religious Analogues
State protectionism often occurs with former religious monopolies that
are now struggling. 35  Those advocating protection argue that certain
In addition, the Federal Communications Commission, although maintaining jurisdiction to
regulate the internet, has "consistently declined to regulate" internet services under the same "infant
industry rationale." Timothy D. Casey & Jeff Magenau, A Hybrid Model of Self-Regulation and
Governmental Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1, 8 n.27 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).
28. Trustbusters Busted, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1981, at 17 (noting that "[tihe EEC
commission's competition office, which during the first half of the 1970s looked like growing into a
fierce watchdog, has become a chihuahua" allowing European governments to support "lame
industries" and allowing the EEC's industrial commissioner Viscount Etienne Davignon to
encourage national steel industries "to form a classic cartel that plots to reduce production to prop up
prices").
29. Patrick Oster, EU Considers Subsidies to European Airlines, WASH. POST, July 23, 1994, at
F8.
30. Id.
31. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
32. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 236 (1966).
33. Id. In 1935, Roosevelt told Congress that subsidies "would have to continue." Id. As World
War 11 approached, the U.S. government funded a "large-scale" investment to expand merchant
ships. Id. at 238. The aviation industry went from enjoying "a blend of subsidies, cartelization, and
public controls" to becoming a "publicly regulated monopoly" like "railroads, motor carriers, and
shipping companies." Id. at 244.
34. Okediji, supra note 21, at 568.
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religions struggling financially and lacking members need time to recover
before foreign religions should be allowed to compete with them.36 Official
state religions and formerly dominant churches37 have been supported by the
state through financial grants and protectionist legislation under this
rationale. Implicitly expressing a desire for protectionism as a struggling
industry, one Russian Orthodox leader exclaimed that after the fall of
Communism the Church has been faced with "very severe competition in the
missionary field from everyone here, from the Moonies and new charismatic
movements to our Catholic brothers. 38
"Struggling religion" arguments are more commonly made by dominant
churches; however, infant industry arguments have also been used to protect
fledgling churches from competition. 39  For example, in late-nineteenth
century America, the infant industry argument was made in the religious
context, claiming that theological seminaries should be protected from
foreign clergymen.n0
Similar to infant industries in the industrial sector that received
protectionist subsidies and tariffs from the state, "infant" or "struggling"
religions also receive state financial aid and protective legislation from
foreign competition.41 In both areas, the state relies on the same "infant" or
"struggling" industry or religion rationale.42 In addition, just as infant
industries received government aid to compete in "hard economic times,"
struggling religions have also received subsidies and protection during
difficult economic as well as moral times.43 Although states protecting
infant religions cannot literally raise the price for foreign religions to
35. See, e.g., Schdtt, supra note 2, at 295 (providing Sweden as an example). The argument
made to protect struggling industries resembles the infant industries argument. See supra notes 19-
20 and accompanying text for further discussion.
36. Harold J. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transition: A
Historical Theory, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECrIVES
303 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996).
37. The Church of Sweden is an example where 88% of the population belongs to the Church but
"less than 4% of the population go to church each week, with almost half of these attending Sunday
morning service." Schott, supra note 2, at 295.
38. Daniel L. Schlafly, Jr., Roman Catholicism in Today's Russia: The Troubled Heritage, in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NORTHERN EUROPE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 125, 136 (Derek H.
Davis ed., 2000) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NORTHERN EUROPE].
39. See, e.g., Parsons Need Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1888, at 9 (applying infant industry
rationale to protect American theological seminaries from foreign entrants).
40. Id. ("[American] theological seminaries, which are infant industries just as much as carding
machines or iron mills, are turning out annually enough of this form of labor product to supply the
home demand and meet the exigencies of missionary service also.").
41. See, e.g., Law on Churches and Religious Societies [Czech Republic], tit. 3 sec. 11, in LAWS
ON RELIGION AND THE STATE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 113 (W. Cole Durham Jr. & Silvio
Ferrari eds., 2003) [hereinafter POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE] (limiting financial benefits to religions
that have been in the country ten years and have over 10,000 members); Schott, supra note 2, at 295,
301(describing state financial support for the Church of Sweden); Zsolt Enyedi, The Contested
Politics of Positive Neutrality in Hungary, in CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 4, at 157-63.
42. See, e.g., Schott, supra note 2, at 295, 301.
43. In Eastern Europe this has been referred to as a "moral vacuum" among citizens that the
dominant church must help fill. See generally infra note 320 and accompanying text.
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compete in the country, states have raised the burden of competing in some
countries through registration requirements and other legislative limits on
minority religions." For example, laws in some states limit proselytizing,
expel or limit foreign missionaries, penalize conversion from a dominant
religion, or refuse to recognize minority religions.
4
B. Domestic and International Unfair Competition
Industrial monopolies benefit from governmental support that takes the
form of tariffs, subsidies, and non-tariff barriers. Similarly, states protect
religious monopolies from domestic and foreign competition through
financial aid subsidies, non-tariff barriers-such as registration
requirements-and protective legislation-such as anti-proselytizing laws.
1. Industry
One essential aspect of achieving an industrial monopoly is obtaining
protection from the state against domestic and foreign competition.4 6 State
protectionism includes tariffs, 47 subsidies, and other non-tariff barriers
"designed to restrict or eliminate foreign competition." Government
protection can also be more subtle, for example shifting government policies
to protect domestic industries.
44. For a thorough discussion of how registration requirements can limit religious minorities, see
generally W. Cole Durham, Jr., Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief Through Religious
Association Laws, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 321 (Tore
Lindholm et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter FACILITATING FREEDOM].
45. See Tad Stahnke, The Right to Engage in Religious Persuasion, in FACILITATING FREEDOM,
supra note 44, at 619 (describing anti-proselytizing legislation); see also FREEDOM OF RELIGION
AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 28-33, 73-77 (Kevin Boyle & Juliet Sheen eds., 1997) [hereinafter
FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF] (describing Egyptian discrimination and laws used against
religious minorities and expulsion of foreign missionaries in Sudan and discrimination against
minorities); U.S. Dep't of State, Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom Report
(2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/27185.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005)
(describing anti-proselytizing laws, closure of churches, bans on foreign or minority religions,
blasphemy laws, discrimination in employment and education, limitations on formation of new
religions or registration of foreign religions, and other forms of state hostility towards minority
religions in a variety of countries).
46. See generally D.T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST (1972); WILLIAM F. SHUGHART
n1, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS (1990).
47. See, e.g., Latin America's Car Industry: Revving Up, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at 72
(describing the Brazilian government's policy of increasing and decreasing tariffs on car imports
from 20% to 70% depending on domestic economic health).
48. John White, Privatization in Eastern and Central Europe, 13 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 19, 20
(Spring 2000) (noting that "protectionism" can be "achieved through high tariff barriers or other
measures designed to restrict or eliminate foreign competition").
Government subsidies allow protected industries to "charge prices
below cost-of-production" for their products, 49 which in turn allows
industries to gain a competitive advantage against foreign competitors.
European airlines, often run as public monopolies, regularly benefit from
government subsidies.5°
Tariffs and quotas are often used to prevent foreign competitors from
succeeding in a domestic market and may be a source of revenue. In the
United States, in tough economic times, policy makers have argued that
American jobs should be protected by restricting imported goods through
quotas and exclusion.5 1 One commentator asserts that the Sherman Act of
1890 was actually passed in a "political bargain" between big business and
opponents of protective tariffs.52 In exchange for the Sherman Act,
"protectionist trade legislation (known popularly as the 'Campaign
Contributors' Tariff Bill') [was] introduced just three months after the
Sherman Act was signed into law."53 Before World War I, "[t]ariffs were
the most important source of [the United States'] federal revenues. 54 After
World War I, Congress set tariffs at the highest level in history under the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act to "sustain economic prosperity.55 Throughout
the post-World War I period the aviation industry also received special
government assistance and protection.56
Some countries take advantage of protectionist government policies to
protect their industries from foreign competition. 57 For example, Brazil has
49. !d. at 20.
50. See The War in the Skies: Airline Regulation, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1993, at 66 (noting
that "dogged politicians on both sides of the Atlantic will remain the biggest obstacle to free trade in
air travel"). Public monopolies have also been defended as a method of achieving "global
competitiveness." Steven Dov Lando, Note, The European Community's Road to
Telecommunications Deregulation, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2159, 2198 (1994).
51. See Lloyd Bentsen, Strong Medicine for Trade Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1985, at A23;
H.R. 380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H-154 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987); S. 549, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S-1053 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987).
52. Shughart et at., supra note 26, at 179.
53. Id.
54. Carolyn C. Jones, Taxes and Peace: A Case Study of Taxing Women, 6 S. CAL. REV. L &
WOMEN'S STUD. 361, 382 (1997) (noting also that "[t]he Republican party's high tariff program won
support from business leaders protected from foreign competition").
55. Miller, supra note 24, at 158 (noting that the "prevailing attitude of the years immediately
preceding World War I was that the United States could sustain and even dramatically increase the
effects of the economic boom of the 'roaring 20's by sharply raising tariffs"'); see also Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1206-
1677 (2000).
56. HAWLEY, supra note 32, at 240 (noting the assistance provided specifically during the 1920s
and 1930s).
57. Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? An Essay on Official Bureaucracy, 2 J. JAPANESE
STUD. 1 (1975) (attributing Japanese economic success to state protectionist practices); CHALMERS
JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MtRACLE (1982) (same); STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM
THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 15, 126,
151 (1990) (same); ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE
INDUSTRIALIZATION 14-18, 72-76 (1989) (same). But see Mathew D. McCubbins & Gregory W.
Noble, The Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats, and the Budget Process in the United
States and Japan, in STRUCTURE AND POLICY IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN 56 (Peter Cowhey & Mathew
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been known to use "a restrictive import licensing system and high tariffs to
prevent access to [the U.S.] specialty steel market.,1 8  Japan also has a
reputation for using informal non-tariff barriers to protect against foreign
competition. 9 A 1987 World Bank study found that the "industrialized
world's most heavily protected market is Japan," despite its rejection of
formal trade tariffs.6 ° Japan's goal is to increase exports and "expand the
international market share of its producers [so] it views protectionist cartels
and monopolies favorably because 'they strengthen Japanese producers
against foreign competition. ' ' 61  Japan has been accused of restricting
imported steel products that it manufactures itself, which largely prevents
U.S. companies from selling products to Japanese customers.62 Japanese
protectionist practices have also been blamed for the downfall of the
American "television industry in the 1960s and 1970s. ''63
D. McCubbins eds., 1995) (asserting that state power over Japan's economy has not been the
primary cause of Japan's successful economic growth); Samuel Kernell, The Primacy of Politics in
Economic Policy, in PARALLEL POLITICS: ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES 325, 326 (Samuel Kernell ed., 1991) ("The Japanese miracle has occurred in the sectors of
the economy where the government has remained relatively uninvolved.").
58. Using American Antitrust Laws to Assure Fair Int'l Competition: Hearing on S. 2610 Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
102nd Cong. 61 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings on Antitrust] (statement of Paul R. Roedel) (noting
that "Brazilian authorities would not issue licenses for materials such as specialty steel which were
already produced in that country" and that "[e]ven if a license could be obtained, the 50 percent
import duty and the additional 25 percent tariff on financial operations would have proven
insurmountable obstacles to U.S. exports").
59. David E. Dreifke, Note, The Foreign Commerce Clause and the Market Participant
Exemption, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 265 (1992); Michael W. Punke, Comment, Structural
Impediments to United States-Japanese Trade: The Collision of Culture and Law, 23 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 55, 57-58 (1990).
60. Dreifke, supra note 59, at 266-67 (noting that while the United States insisted on "free trade,
throughout the 1980s, Japan 'openly restricted imports, subsidized exports. and became the world's
richest per capita industrial nation"'); see also PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE 24 (1990).
61. Dreifke, supra note 59, at 267, 269 (noting also that the "Japanese manipulate their economic
power... through government-sanctioned cartels to... further their overarching national trade
goals"); see also James Fallows, Japan: Playing by Different Rules, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1987, at
26.
62. Hearings on Antitrust, supra note 58, at 61 (statement of Paul R. Roedel) (echoing this claim
made by United States steel industry specialists); see also id. at 87 (statement of Lloyd Constantine)
(noting that the dominance of the Japanese technology industry is due to "coordinated action of the
Japanese industry and Government, aided and abetted by the inaction of our own Government and
defects in the American law").
63. Hearings on Antitrust, supra note 58, at 1 (statement of Senator Metzenbaum). American
experts also accuse the Japanese consumer electronics industry price-fixing activities in the United
States. Id. at 133 (statement of Lloyd Constantine).
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Subtle government protections may include offering tax incentives or
easing antitrust enforcement against select industries. 64 In the United States,
President George Bush Sr. "publicly supported measures aimed at easing the
antitrust treatment of corporate research joint ventures to spur the
development of the new technologies necessary for meeting the challenge of
foreign competition. 65 Some evidence indicates that the level of antitrust
enforcement actually corresponds to perceived threats by foreign
competitors. 66
Government protections, including tariffs, subsidies, and non-tariff
barriers, all decrease competition in an industry.
2. Religious Analogues
States similarly protect favored religious groups from competition
through financial aid, subsidies, non-tariff barriers, such as registration
requirements, and protective legislation, such as anti-proselytizing laws.
Many churches are largely funded through state financial contributions.67
States also protect religious monopolies through non-tariff barriers such as
registration requirements that limit foreign churches' ability to function in
the country or prevent them from holding worship services without a license.
For example in Russia, the 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law "refus[es] to
recognize foreigners' right to form religious groups or religious
organizations... unless they permanently reside in the Russian
Federation. 68 Foreign religions who do not "receive the status of a religious
association... may not engage in liturgical or other religious activities. ' 69
64. Party Time: Brazil's Car Industry, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1994 (noting that in 1992 the
Brazilian government "cut taxes on small cars provided the companies [manufacturing these cars]
cut the prices... to around $7,350).
65. Shughart et al., supra note 26, at 179-81 (noting that some argue that protection of domestic
industry results in "public antitrust agencies plac[ing] the protection of selected domestic
competitors ahead of the goal of promoting competition); see also id. at 187 (noting that when
foreign competition increases, antitrust funding actually increases).
66. Id. at 179; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1501 (1998) (describing the self interest of U.S. national enforcement of international antitrust
laws). Commentators are divided about whether domestic antitrust enforcement decreases when
"foreign producers make greater inroads into the domestic economy." Shughart et al., supra note 26,
at 181 (noting that some argue that protection of domestic industry results in "public antitrust
agencies plac[ing] the protection of selected domestic competitors ahead of the goal of promoting
competition"); see also id. at 187 (noting that when foreign competition increases, antitrust funding
actually increases).
67. Enyedi, supra note 41, at 163 (pointing out that "state finance contributes three quarters of
the overall budgets" of Hungarian churches including education and social subsidiaries of these
churches). Enyedi also points out that "mainstream churches receive half of their finances from the
state and less than a quarter from their members." Id.
68. T. Jeremy Gunn, Caesar's Sword: The 1997 Law of the Russian Federation on the Freedom
of Conscience and Religious Associations 7, available at http://www.law.emory.edu/EILR/volumes/
win98/gunn.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005). Note also that "[o]rganizations located in Russia" that
have "parent or sister organizations with 'directive centers located abroad' do not constitute foreign
organizations. Durham & Homer, supra note 14, at 33.
69. Gunn, supra note 68, at 8 (noting that "[u]nder this provision, a group of Roman Catholic
priests on an official visit to Russia may not legally pray together").
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Islamic states impose even harsher penalties to avoid competition; some
Islamic states protect state religions by criminally punishing blasphemy and
conversion.70 Other states rely on protective legislation that places dominant
religions in favored status. For example in Portugal, the government grants
special privileges to the Catholic Church, which is ruled under different laws
than other denominations.7 1 Similarly, the Orthodox Church in Greece is
treated "with special interest and in a favourable manner."72 Other states
have separate categories of "recognized and non-recognized" religions, with
the dominant religion existing as the "primus inter pares" among the
recognized.73
Both the Greek and Iranian governments have instituted anti-
proselytizing laws to prevent foreign competing churches from gaining
support. The Greek laws apply to all churches but are aimed primarily at
evangelical Christian churches that are gaining popularity among Greek
Orthodox Church members.74 The Iranian government recently cracked
down on "increasing proselytizing activities by evangelical Christians whose
services are conducted in Persian.,75  Iranian government officials have
70. Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 WiS. INT'L
L.J. 349, 396 (1996). For example, "[iln Yemen, the 1990 Law on the Press and Publications bans
any publication which. . . 'prejudices the Islamic faith and its lofty principles or belittles religions or
humanitarian creeds... [and which] distort[s] the image of the Yemeni, Arab or Islamic heritage."'
Id. In Sudan, "article 126 of the 1991 Sudanese Penal Code officially codifies the death penalty for
any non-repenting Muslim who 'advocates the rejection of Islamic beliefs or announces his own
rejection of Islam by word or act."' Id. In a case illustrating the potential reach of this law, Sudan's
justice minister as well as its government-controlled press attacked a human rights investigator
reporting to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The investigator's report described Sudan's
slave trade and noted that its criminal code authorizes punishments such as amputation and
crucifixion. As a result, the investigator, a Hungarian law professor, was called "satanic" and "an
enemy of Islam" guilty of "blasphemy." Id.
Other examples include Indonesian students who were "convicted in 1992 of blasphemy and
publicly defaming Muslims because they engaged in a spontaneous word play involving puns on
Quranic verses during a rock concert"; Saudi Arabian newspaper editors who "facetiously
questioned the existence of God" through printing a comic strip were sentenced to prison and a
penalty of lashes; and an Iranian cartoonist and editor were also sentenced for "a drawing of a soccer
player adjudged to resemble the late Ayatollah Khomeini." Id. at 396-97.
71. Vitalino Canas, State and Church in Portugal, in STATE AND CHURCH, supra note 2, at 271
(pointing out also that the Catholic Church's influence is "reinforced by owning a national radio
broadcasting channel (Rddio Renascenga) and a private television channel").
72. Charalambos Papastathis, State and Church in Greece, in STATE AND CHURCH, supra note 2,
at 77.
73. Rik Torfs, State and Church in Belgium, in STATE AND CHURCH, supra note 2, at 35
(describing the Belgian state as favoring the Catholic Church among all of the recognized religions).
74. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text for discussion of Greek anti-proselytism laws.
75. Iran: International Religious Freedom Report, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Oct. 26, 2001, at 6 [hereinafter Iran Report 2001], available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5691.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); see also 2001 Annual
Report on International Religious Freedom, U.S. Dep't of State, at 429, available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/9001.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2005) (describing harrassment
closed evangelical churches and limited meetings to Sundays only, arrested
converts, required evangelical church members "to carry membership
cards," and face "identity checks by authorities posted outside congregation
centers. 76 The government also ordered church officials to "inform the
Ministry of Information and Islamic Guidance before admitting new
members to their congregations." 7
In both the industrial and religious arena, the goal of subsidies, tariffs
and protective legislation is to give favored domestic entities a competitive
advantage against foreign and domestic competitors. 8  Government-
imposed tariffs operate in the industrial arena to increase prices and limit the
success of foreign competitors in the domestic market. 79 The closest parallel
in the religious arena are outright bans on and registration requirements for
foreign religions which limit the number and type of religions that are
allowed access to the country. 0 State subsidies to certain industries are also
very similar to state financial aid to dominant religions, since both give the
entity a financial advantage and a greater ability to compete.8 ' Protectionist
legislation, such as anti-proselytism laws, 82 resembles non-tariff barriers
which prohibit imported products that the state manufactures, since anti-
proselytism laws also decrease direct competition with a dominant religion.83
The parallel between Japan's prohibitions on the types of steel that it imports
is strikingly similar to the Iranian government's prohibition on proselytizing
in evangelical churches who conduct services in Farsi. With prohibitions
only on churches which conduct services for Persians, the government
expresses its fear that Persian citizens (who are primarily Muslim) will
convert to Christianity, not that foreigners living in the state will convert
from one Christian sect to another. Both the Japanese and Iranian
governments seem concerned less with general foreign religious or industrial
success but only foreign success at the expense of their industry or their
dominant faith.
11[. ASSERTED BENEFITS OF STATE PROTECTION TO THE STATE AND
SOCIETY
Industrial monopolies, religions, and even states often justify protection
with four arguments about how protectionism benefits the state and society.
of Jewish and evangelical proselytizing communities for the "printing of materials or delivery of
sermons in Persian").
76. Iran Report 2001, supra note 75.
77. Id.
78. See generally supra Part 11-B.
79. See generally supra Part H1-B-1.
80. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text for discussion of Iranian registration of
Evangelical Christians, and note 14 on Russian registration laws; see also infra Part IV-A-2 for
discussion of limitations on certain religions.
81. See supra Part n-A.
82. See generally infra Part IV-B-2 and accompanying text for discussion.
83. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text for discussion about Japanese non-tariff
barriers.
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First, they argue that protection of certain industries helps maintain social
stability through retaining stable employment and services. Religious
monopolies claim that they will maintain social stability by continuing to
uphold national traditions and by providing political legitimacy for the state.
Second, the state claims that certain industries, such as steel and aviation, are
vital to national security and would threaten societal safety if sacrificed to
foreign competitors. A dominant church may similarly assert that national
security is weakened without tightened state control over the rights of
minority religions through criminal punishment, anti-cult legislation, and
government investigations. Third, the state may argue that an industry, such
as a national airline, defines the national identity and culture and must be
preserved. Religious monopolies may similarly assert that the best way to
preserve national identity and culture is through allowing the dominant
church to educate the people and through recognizing an official state
religion. Finally, an industry or religion may argue that the country will
become dependent on foreign entities if it does not protect a certain domestic
industry or religion.
A. Social Stability
Both industries and religions assert that state protection maintains social
stability. Industrial monopolies, especially public monopolies, allegedly
maintain social stability through consistent employment, prices and service
in an industry. Religious monopolies also allegedly maintain social stability
through ideological unity, preserving national traditions and upholding the
political legitimacy of the state.
1. Industry
Industry advocates claim that state protected industries84 are more stable
than private industries since they benefit from government regulation.
Private industries vary in the number of people they are able to employ,
areas they are able to serve and length of operation, depending on fluctuating
market conditions. Along this vein, antitrust suits brought by the
Department of Justice have been criticized for causing social instability
through "destroying business confidence, retarding recovery, and hampering
industrial efficiency and stability."85
84. One example of a public monopoly was AT&T, which controlled "80 percent of the local
phone market and.., more than 90 percent of the long-distance market" and was regulated by the
government. Merrill Brown, AT&T Antitrust Case Opens to Attacks by Government, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 1981, at D1.
85. HAWLEY, supra note 32, at 444 (providing an argument made in the 1930s).
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2. Religious Analogues
Religious monopolies maintain that they are in important ingredient of
social stability because they contribute to the political legitimacy for a state.
Dominant religions in countries like the former Soviet bloc, where
governments struggle to gain "popular legitimacy," provide such legitimacy
in some nations' establishment of legal and constitutional principles. 6
Social stability is maintained by the dominant church in Greece, for
example, as it "provide[s] for harmony within the Christian polity" while the
state "handle[s] the legal and political matters, securing the environment for
the flourishing of Orthodox Christianity. 87 Bulgaria, Greece, and Moldova
have also attempted to secure social stability through trying to force Muslim
or Orthodox break-off groups to integrate with the majority faction, attempts
that have been struck down by the European Court of Human Rights.88 In
these cases, states have relied on arguments that "social tension" would
result from divided religious loyalties 89 or that pluralism would negatively
affect its relations with a dominant religion. 90 Recent legislation in Bulgaria
was in part designed to resolve a schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church,
and has in effect made it impossible for the "schismatic" group to be
registered. 91
Dominant religions also assert to provide social stability through
working with the state to restrict some foreign or minority religions. In
some European countries, minority religions, especially foreign religions,
are deemed to disrupt social stability.92 New minority religions have
86. Enyedi, supra note 41, at 157 (noting also that "politicians [in Eastern Europe] see in
churches the potential providers" of legitimacy).
87. Daniel P. Payne, The Clash of Civilizations: The Church of Greece, the European Union and
the Question of Human Rights, 31 RELIG. STATE & Soc. 261, 267 (2003). This symbiotic
relationship that provides political legitimacy for the state and preserves the faith-promoting function
of the Orthodox church is called "symphonia." Id. In Denmark, the church and government
participate in creating a legal framework consisting of secular and "theologically-founded rule[s]."
Inger Dubeck, State and Church in Denmark, in STATE AND CHURCH, supra note 2, at 39 (noting
that the Danish National Church and the Danish government create a "double norm-system" of legal
rules enforced by the "physical power" of the court system and "church rule[s]" based "upon the
confessional books or... upon the customs or cultural traditions of the religious community" and
enforced by sanctions) (internal quotations omitted). Statesman Edmund Burke of England claimed
that the establishment of the Anglican Church in England was "essentiar to the state and was "the
foundation of [England's] whole constitution." Michael W. McConnell, Edmund Burke's Tolerant
Establishment, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT 243 (Noel B. Reynolds & W. Cole
Durham, Jr. eds., 1996) (emphasis added). Burke also noted that the Anglican Church was a "barrier
against fanaticism, infidelity, and atheism" and was a "great national benefit" and "a great public
blessing." Id. at 242-43 (internal quotations omitted).
88. Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (1999); Hasan and Chaush v.
Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55 (2000); Case of Metropolitan Church of
Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 (2001).
89. Serif, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (1999).
90. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 (2001).
91. See Religious Denominations Act [Bulgaria], art. 10, in POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE, supra
note 41, at 77.
92. For a discussion of stigmatization of minority religions by associating them with "cults" or
"sects" in Western Europe, see U.S. Dep't of State, 2003 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
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particularly been the subject of intense scrutiny in France and Belgium,
where government centers and interministerial missions have been created to
observe so-called "sects" and combat "deviant sectarian behavior." 93  In
Germany, the growth of some minority religions is perceived as a threat to
the dominant church which deprives Germans of "ideological solidarity" and
"political stability. 94 Placing restrictions on minority religions, including
"cult classification," is a tactic used by the German government. 95 The
government denies some churches legal status depriving them of tax
exemption and the opportunity to participate in official state duties. 96 The
German government is partly concerned with stability in this classification
since a "cult" is granted legal status when "in the light of its statute and the
size of its membership, it gives every indication of durability." 97 In Russia,
minority religious organizations, especially foreign organizations, have been
deemed suspicious and are viewed as threats to social stability, partly
because they challenge "the national customs and tradition, morals of
society" and "arouse ethnic, racial and religious discord.
9 8
Converting members of a dominant religion and criticizing dominant
religious leaders are considered destructive of social stability in Iran. The
Iranian government inflicts restrictions and often harsh punishment on
minority religious groups who "[attempt] to convert Muslims."99 Critics of a
dominant church have also been punished for disrupting social stability. For
example, a popular Shi'a cleric was sentenced to eighteen months in prison
for criticizing the Islamic religious leaders for misusing religion, mistaking
themselves with Islam and national interests and believing they should be
REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (released Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
irf/2003/27185.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
93. In Belgium, this takes the form of the government-sponsored "Center for Information and
Advice on Harmful Sectarian Organizations." See http://www.ciaosn.be/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
In France, a Parliamentary inquiry commission published a report containing a list of 172 so-called
"sects." Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enqute sur les sectes, ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE,
REPORT No. 2468 (Dec. 22, 1995), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/rap-
enq/r2468.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). An "interministerial mission to fight against deviant
sectarian behavior" has also been formed. Id.
94. Derek H. Davis, Religious Persecution in Today's Germany: Old Habits Renewed, in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NORTHERN EUROPE, supra note 38, at 107, 110-12.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
98. Marat S. Shterin & James T. Richardson, Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia:
Precursors of Russia's New National Law, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NORTHERN EUROPE, supra
note 38, at 141, 148 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
99. Annual Repert of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 18, 31,
May 2003, available at www.uscirf.gov/reports/l2MayO4/finalReport.php3 [hereinafter Annual
Report 2003] (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) (noting that Iran "engages in [or tolerates] systematic,
ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture and
executions based primarily or entirely upon the religion of the accused").
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"immune from criticism." 10o Due to these statements, the clerk was charged
with "violating Islamic principles," and "disturbing public opinion."' 0'
Both protected industries and dominant religions assert that they
maintain social stability. Just as protected industries boast that they maintain
general business confidence, dominant religions claim to uphold national
opinion of the state. Similarly, protected industries' claims that they
maintain steady employment and services resemble protected religions
claims that they uphold stable national traditions.
B. National Security
Both industrial and religious monopolies have successfully used
national security arguments to obtain protection against foreign competition.
Industries, including shipping, transportation, steel, farming and
telecommunications, have used a pending war as well as the threat of future
war to preserve state subsidies and tariffs. Similarly, religions benefit from
protection, especially in states like Iran where the dominant religion is
highly enmeshed with the state, and any threats to the religious monopoly by
minority religions are punished criminally as a threat to national security.
Even in Germany and Russia, the state equates some foreign religious
organizations as threats to national security.
1. Industry
Throughout history, during wartime industries often "equat[e] business
interests with the national interest" and argue for state protection.10 2  The
United States' founding father Alexander Hamilton favored protection of
industries partly to "provide protection in time of war."'0 3  During World
100. Iran Report 2001, supra note 75, at 9-10. The Shi'a cleric, Hojatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar,
made statements "criticiz[ing] [religious leaders'] misuse of religion to maintain power." Id. He
also "observed [in a newspaper article] that [religious leaders] mistake themselves with Islam, with
national interests, or with the interests of the system... [believing] that they should be immune from
criticism." Id. In April 1999, Kadivar was also charged for "advocat[ing] political reform and
greater intellectual freedom." Id.
101. Id. at 10. Salaam, the daily newspaper in Salaam that published these statements, and its
publisher, were also sentenced. Id. The three parties were also charged with "endangering national
security." Id. In January 2001, the Tehran General Court "ordered the closure" of an independent
journal, Kiyan, for "publish[ing] lies, disturb[ing] public opinion and insult[ing] sacred religion." Id.
Interestingly, the perceived threats by Iran's Islamic government are not just with minority religions
but even Shi'a Muslims who criticize the regime. Id. at 9.
102. HAWLEY, supra note 32, at 10-11 (documenting that the majority of people believed that
"what was good for business, or at least what businessmen thought was good for them, was by
definition good for everyone").
103. Besides the arguments that protection of industries would "encourage domestic
manufacture," Alexander Hamilton argued that protection "would encourage the development of the
nation's resources, promote economic and political independence, and provide protection in time of
war." Mark E. Brandon, Home on the Range: Family and Constitutionalism in American
Continental Settlement, 52 EMORY L.J. 645, 669 (2003); see generally Alexander Hamilton, Report
Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit, in 6 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 23, at 51-168.
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War II, the "antitrust campaign became a casualty of the war effort" because
it was argued that the "conduct of a war... called for a carefully planned,
highly controlled and well-coordinated economy."' 4 In fact, during the war,
industries disapproved of the "national-defense cases" brought by Thurman
Arnold, head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.' °5
Industry defenders claimed that these cases caused "unremitting
interference" and "cumulative harassment.' 0 6  Industry arguments led to
certain industries receiving "immunity from antitrust action" for "activities
as were requisite for the prosecution of the war.'
0 7
Even in peaceful times, national security arguments have been used to
justify protection of industry in preemptive preparation for war. During the
1930s, the U.S. transportation industry benefited from state protection
because of the "contention that the nation's security and prosperity depended
upon [it] . . . ."'08 In addition farmers, coal operators, and oil industrialists
avoided "the agitation against monopoly" using arguments that they were
special cases that justified creation of "publicly sponsored cartels" due to
"national defense and public safety."' 9 Industry commentators have also
argued that "[riapid development of the [aviation] industry.., was vital to
the national defense. . . .""0 Even after World War I, President Roosevelt
allowed subsidization of the "merchant marine" industry, claiming it "was
necessary for national defense and national security."'' l  In the 1980's
during the antitrust suit against AT&T, in spite of the Sherman, Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts, politicians opposed state antitrust suits. President
Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, wrote a letter to
Attorney General William French Smith requesting that he dismiss the
government's antitrust suit against AT&T." 2 Weinberger argued that "the
104. HAWLEY, supra note 32, at 442.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (resulting in the Antitrust Division canceling "investigations of the steel, shipbuilding,
and aircraft industries and postpone[ing] major suits in the petroleum, electrical manufacturing,
chemical, and plumbing industries").
108. Id. at 234-35 (noting also that the transportation industry claimed that it was a natural
monopoly where "capital requirements were large, fixed costs were high, and rivalry was wasteful").
From 1817, American ships "enjoyed a legal monopoly of the coastwise and intercoastal trade." Id.
at 235.
109. Id. at 245-46.
110. Id. at 240. Further, the industry argued that "because it was still in the pioneer stage, risky,
speculative, and unable to offer assured returns, the industry on its own could never attract the large
capital outlays that were necessary for rapid expansion." Id. The government supported the aviation
industry through the Acts of 1925, 1926, and 1930 with several aids and subsidies. Id. The aviation
subsidy program also became the "subject of a number of abuses" like the shipping subsidies. Id.
11. Id. at 236.
112. Trustbusters Busted, supra note 28, at 17. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger adopted
a "military view of AT&T' and insisted that it was "an integral part of the national defense." PETER
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unity of Ma Bell's communications network is essential to 'national
security.' 113  AT&T also argued that the Justice Department's divestiture
plan was "not in the country's best interests.' ' 14  National security
arguments have often proved especially persuasive rationales for state
protection of industries."5
2. Religious Analogues
Some religious monopolies, especially those closely tied with the state,
make similar claims that national security is compromised without state
protection of the favored religion. States respond to perceived national
security threats by limiting the rights of minority religions through criminal
punishment, anti-cult legislation, and government investigations.
Under early Islamic law, national security included subjugating
nonbelievers in the dominant Islamic faith in order to "protect the welfare of
the Muslim community against enemies." ' 1 6 In many modem-day Islamic
countries, such as Iran, and other areas, such as Nepal and some provinces in
India, it is a crime to convert from the dominant faith. 117  In the case of
Sudan, Pakistan, and Iran, apostasy from Islam is punishable by death."
8
Iran also refuses to officially recognize minority religious groups, especially
those who have been accused of "espionage" activities with adversary
foreign countries.ll9 The Iranian government is particularly concerned with
TEMIN & Louis GALAMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS
223 (1987). The "defense establishment relied on AT&T for its communications, and the
department was leery of changing the integrated network--or, at least, of changing it very rapidly."
Id. (citation omitted). Weinberger felt that AT&T was "the nation's vital telecommunications
system." Id. at 229.
113. Trustbusters Busted, supra note 28, at 17. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger testified
before the Senate claiming that "the American Telephone & Telegraph network is the most
important communication network we have to service our strategic systems in this country... it
seems to me essential that we keep together this one communications network we now have, and
have to rely on." TEMIN & GALAMBOS, supra note 112, at 224 (noting also that "AT&T dropped
from the third largest prime contractor to the Defense Department in 1971 to the twenty-fourth in
1981") (citations omitted). In addition, the size and credibility of the AT&T network also caused
government officials to oppose divestiture. Id. The Economist goes on to comment that
Weinberger's argument was "horse feathers" and questioned "why on earth American military
muscle will be weakened if Western Electric is spun off from AT&T and has to compete on an equal
footing with others to supply telephone equipment to the clients of this quasi-monopoly?" Id.
114. The Break-up-AT&T Trial Begins, Bus. WK., Jan. 19, 1981, at 84B.
115. National Security arguments are effective because they "deter many critics from asking
pointed questions that ought to be posed." Trustbusters Busted, supra note 28, at 17.
116. See Arzt, supra note 70, at 379; see also Abdullah Saeed, The Historical Context of the
Debate on Apostasy and the Roots of Intolerance, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY, AND ISLAM
20-34 (Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed eds., 2004).
117. See Nazila Ghanea, Apostasy and Freedom to Change Religion or Belief, in FACILITATING
FREEDOM, supra note 44, at 669, 679-81 (citing laws in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
Sudan); Iran Report 2001, supra note 75, at 3 (Iran).
118. Said Amir Arjomand, Religious Human Rights and the Principle of Legal Pluralism in the
Middle East, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 36, at 342-43 (Sudan, Pakistan, and Iran); Iran Report 2001, supra note 75, at 3 (Iran).
119. Annual Report 2003, supra note 99, at 32.
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minority religions, like Baha'i and Jews, which it perceives to threaten
national security. When confronted about why the Baha'i organization is
not recognized as a religion in Iran, government officials stated that Baha'is
"are not a religious minority, but a [counterrevolutionary political
organization] which... is against the Iranian Revolution and engages in
espionage activities." 20 In addition several prominent Iranian Jewish
professors have been charged with acts of "espionage on behalf of Israel.''
Similar, though less restrictive, practices occur in Europe. Several
Western European nations have investigated new religious movements,
including the European Parliament, 122 the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium,
and France. 23 Germany created a "Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry"
designed to determine whether "the beliefs and practices of religious groups
imperil the state. ' 2 4  Russians similarly fear that people join foreign
religions to be affiliated with a foreign organization rather than because of
their religious beliefs. 25 In December 2002, a report was leaked in Russia,
attributed to numerous federal government officials, that specifically lists
Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, militant Islam, and new "foreign" sects
as threats to Russia's national security. 26 The Russian anti-cult movement
relies on the premise that foreign religions are "a threat to the Russian
120. Iran Report 2001, supra note 75, at 2, 4 (Baha'is are charged with "espionage" when they
send monetary contributions to the Baha'i headquarters located in the state of Israel.). They are also
associated with former Shah Pahlavi's regime. Id. Other broad "restrictions on Baha'is appear to be
aimed at destroying them as a community." Id. at 4. In 1998, several Baha'i professors "were
convicted under Article 498 of the Penal Code and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 10
years" for establishing a "'secret organization' engaged in attracting youth, teaching against Islam,
and teaching against the regime of the Islamic Republic." Id. at 7. Baha'i groups claim that the
professors "taught general science and Persian literature courses." Id.
121. Iran Report 2001, supra note 75, at 8 (stating that espionage on behalf of Israel is punishable
by death). In 2000, the defendants were "convicted on charges of illegal contact with Israel,
conspiracy to form an illegal organization, and recruiting agents." Id. The Iranian Jews charged
with espionage included "prominent rabbis, teachers of Hebrew, and their students." Id.
122. Rapporteur's Report on Behalf of the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information
and Sport on the Activity of Certain New Religious Movements Within the European Community,
European Parliament Doc. 1-47/84 (1984).
123. See Eileen Barker, Why the Cults?: New Religious Movements and Freedom of Religion or
Belief, in FACILITATING FREEDOM, supra note 44, at 571, 584-86 (listing and evaluating various
government commissions and reports).
124. Davis, supra note 94, at 111. Some leaders demonstrate concern that foreign religions will
"[corrupt] ... the spirit" by teaching non-Christian beliefs. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 98, at
148-49 (citation omitted).
125. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 98, at 148. Some Russians perceive foreign religions as
"infectious" and as "totalitarian sects." Id. at 155 (internal quotations omitted).
126. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Report on the Russian Federation 2
(May 2003), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/02MayO3/russia.php3?scale=1024 (last
visited Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Report on the Russian Federation].
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national security" in its "appeal to the Russian public and the state."'127 In
addition, some Russians believe that foreign religious organizations "use
religion as a cover for espionage."' 128  The Moldovan government, in
refusing to recognize a minority religion, similarly asserted that the church
was a "threat to national security and territorial integrity.'
129
Both industries and religions receive state protections by invoking
national security arguments. Just as industries during war claim that
protecting their business interest protects the national interest, dominant
religions argue that minority religions must be closely controlled to protect
the national interest. In addition, as industries claim that forbidding state
protection sacrificies national needs to foreign competitors, dominant
religions warn governments that without protection foreign influences
brought by minority religions will cause societal harm. In both areas where
national security is allegedly threatened, some state action is taken: in the
industrial arena fewer antitrust suits are brought against monopolies and in
the religious arena the government cracks down on minority religions with
government investigations or criminal punishment.
C. National Identity, Prestige, and Culture
Both industries and religions claim that national identity and prestige is
weaker without state protection. European airlines and the AT&T
telecommunications monopoly both argued that they were a source of
national prestige and pride, without which an important national industry
would fail. 130 AT&T also connected its successes with the success of the
United States.' 3' Similarly, both Greece and Sweden claimed that without
protection of dominant religions, the nation would lack unity and would be
destroyed. 132  In both areas, dominant religions and industries have been
protected from competition through a link with the nation's well-being,
national identity and prestige.
127. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 98, at 158. The movement has proven successful with
many "bureaucrats and politicians." Id. at 159.
128. Brian Gross, Comment, Russia's War on Political and Religious Extremism: An Appraisal of
the Law "On Counteracting Extremist Activity," 2003 BYU L. REv. 717, 720 (noting that citizens
claim that foreign organizations discourage fulfillment of citizens' responsibility); see also LYNN R.
ELIASON, PERESTROIKA OF THE RUSSIAN SOUL: RELIGIOUS RENAISSANCE IN THE SOVIET UNION 68
(1991) (describing Russian fear of the "conspiratorial potential" of foreign religions).
129. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 13, 124-25 (2001).
130. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text for further discussion. During congressional
debates discussing deregulation, AT&T touted a "grand system" that in "scale and proficiency is
unique on the face of the earth." Monopolization in the Telecommunications Industry: Hearings
before the H.R. Subcomm. on Communications of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
94th Cong. 19 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings on Communications] (statement of Chairman deButts of
AT&T). Chairman deButts also distinguished his industry from the "automobile business, the
merchandising business, the chemical business, [and] the steel business" claiming that they only sell
a product but that the telecommunications industry is based on vital service. Id. at 30-31.
131. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 140-42 & 147 and accompanying text.
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1. Industry
European airlines have been a source of prestige and national identity.
In Europe, every major airline has been "at least partly state-owned."' 3
Several European countries have sustained state protection in the airline
industry because of "national prestige."'134 European governments have been
more concerned with "preserv[ing] both jobs and prestige" than with
obtaining efficient airline carriers.
35
In the United States, AT&T invoked the country's pride in industrial
progress and a successful telecommunications system to argue that AT&T
should not face breakup. When threatened with divestiture, AT&T appealed
to national identity and pride. One argument AT&T used to defend against
divestiture was that it would destroy "the most advanced, efficient, and
successful communications system in the world."' 136 AT&T lawyers also
commented that they hoped that "the country" realized that "we can't
destroy our successful companies.' 37  A few months before the AT&T
settlement with the Department of Justice which divested AT&T's twenty-
two local operating company subsidiaries, AT&T Chairman Charles L.
Brown commented that it was teaming up two technologies (computer and
telecommunication) which would result in the "most promising and most
exciting [innovations] in the history of this nation's industrial progress. "'38
Congressmen also opposed regulation of AT&T, claiming that AT&T is a
"service system we are particularly proud of in America ....
2. Religious Analogues
In a similar manner, states justify protectionist measures by claiming
that a religious monopoly preserves national identity and culture.
Protectionist measures justified by preserving national identity may include
explicitly recognizing an official state church, religious education in the
dominant religion or prohibiting foreign competing religions to enter the
133. See The War in the Skies: Airline Regulation, supra note 50.
134. See Don't Coddle or Curb Them; The Pain in the World's Airline Industry Can Be Eased by
More American-Style Deregulation, Not Less, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 1991, at 18; see also
Editorial, Keep those Flags Flying, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1994, at A20 (noting that European
countries face trouble deregulating because they have "their own national flag carriers and are
desperate, for reasons of prestige and sentiment, to keep them aloft").
135. The War in the Skies: Airline Regulation, supra note 50.
136. The Break-up-AT&T Trial Begins, supra note 114, at 84B.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Hearings on Communications, supra note 130, at 5 (statement of Wyoming State
Representative Roncalio).
country. State-protected churches also insist that their religion is inseparable
from the national identity and is vital for state "self-preservation."
140
Defenders of religious protection claim that the culture of a nation is
tied to a church and must be preserved. For example in Greece, Orthodox
education in school is defended "solely on national grounds-and not on
moral grounds" because the church emphasizes that the "endangered nation"
will be destroyed by pluralistic education.14 1 Similarly, in Sweden, people
worry that in such a diverse nation; there are "few other ways besides
religion" to base "national unity.,' 142  In Britain, an Anglican Church
Archbishop defended church establishment by claiming that it "was an
essential bulwark of British society."'143  He insisted that the Anglican
Church protected and fortified British society.'44
Often state traditions and national identity are intertwined with a
common religious background which defenders argue justifies state religious
protection. 45 In Ireland, the preamble to the constitution "suggests that the
140. Mavrogordatos, supra note 5, at 122, 134. In Russia, "pluralism is perceived as a problem
that needs to be restricted, not as a long term source of stability." Durham & Homer, supra note 14,
at 3.
141. Mavrogordatos, supra note 5, at 134 (noting that Greece, Ireland and Israel all suffer from
the same issue). Other religions have insisted that their members vote for parties that represent
"Christian-national values" demonstrating a link between religion and national identity. Enyedi,
supra note 41, at 166 (quoting the Calvinist Church in a 2002 Hungarian election) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Payne, supra note 87, at 264-65. Payne notes that "[in the East...
national identity was not separated from religious identity" but "[i]n the West... national identity
was secularised" and that in Greece, "Orthodox hierarchs ... are concerned about the loss of
Orthodox identity to a homogenous western culture." Id. at 264. He quotes Archbishop
Christodoulous who in May 2000 "commented that [flor Greeks, to be an Orthodox Christian is a
defining attribute of their identity." Id. at 265 (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, Payne
points out that Greece, Poland, Slovenia and Serbia all have "unique [national] origin myths that
involve religious identity." Id. For Greeks, the connection with religion does not end with Greek
national identity, as Archbishop Christodoulous also noted that the "European Union is a creation of
the spirituality of Christianity." Id. at 266.
142. Jonas Alwall, Religious Liberty in Sweden: An Overview, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
NORTHERN EUROPE, supra note 38, at 181, 182 (describing the Swedish "effort in trying to impose a
Swedish church order" between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries). In Swedish history,
"faith and unity" were "tested and tightened" through external military threats. Id. In 1634, the
"Instrument of Government" asserted that "[u]nity in religion and the right [to] divine service is the
strongest foundation for a rightful, unanimous and lasting government." Id. at 182-83. In 1686,
Sweden also linked "a person's religious status" to "his citizenship." Id. at 183. This concept was
reaffirmed by the "Instrument of Government of 1809," providing "that the state had a responsibility
to provide for the citizens' religious care." Id. at 184-85 (internal quotation omitted). "[I]n 1951, a
Religious Liberty Act" recognized a citizen's right to "practise his religion freely." Id. at 186. In
1974, the "Instrument of Government" held that religious liberty is "the freedom to practice one's
own religion either alone or in company with others." Id. at 186 (internal quotations omitted). It
recognized a person's rights vis-A-vis the government alone. Id. Even today, the Church of Sweden
is such a dominant part of the culture that all burials in Sweden are "the responsibility of the
Church" and the Church's principles comprise the religious instruction in the Swedish school
system. Id. at 194-95.
143. Madeley, supra note 4, at 4 (quoting Archibishop George Carey).
144. Id.
145. Schtitt, supra note 2, at 300.
[The] Church [of Sweden's] activities over the centuries have played a very important
part in the development of Swedish society. Society has been profoundly influenced by
912
[Vol. 32: 885, 2005] Religious Monopolies
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
common good should be evaluated by religious criteria and implicitly
identifies the Irish nation with the Catholic religion.' 46  Sweden defends
preferential policies toward the Church of Sweden with claims that "strong
historical ties between the Church and the state could not be altogether
disregarded."' 147 Defenders of the establishment of the Church of England
claimed that the church was "part of the time-honored constitutional
structure of England" rather than necessarily the right church for the
citizens. 48 In addition, national identity in Russia is tied to the Orthodox
Church which "believes that the nation ... is still Holy Russia.' ' 149  The
Russian Orthodox Church is believed to be "organically linked with Russia's
[ethnic and] national identity"'15 and therefore many argue it "must be
legally protected.''. The Russian Orthodox Church also relies on the long-
standing culture of the Russian people which includes a thousand years of
Christianity [and] [f]rom the viewpoint of the State today ... there is still good reason
for taking a positive view of religious activities, partly in view of their important societal
functions.
Id.
146. Kissane, supra note 5, at 77. The preamble to the Irish Constitution states:
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our
final end, all actions both of men and states must be referred, We, the people of Eire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who
sustained our fathers through centuries of trial ... and seeking to promote the common
good... Do hereby adopt, enact, and give ourselves this Constitution.
Id. at 76-77. Further, this preamble has been cited "in the [Irish] Supreme Court to justify the
prevention of a decision rendering unconstitutional certain nineteenth-century statutes criminalizing
homosexual conduct between consenting adult males." Id. at 77.
147. Stegeby, supra note 14, at 733, 747 (noting that the strong historical ties between the state
and Church of Sweden also justified the Church maintaining the responsibility of providing burial
grounds and maintaining and preserving historical churches and monuments).
148. McConnell, supra note 87, at 209 ("Edmund Burke contended that '[t]he Anglican Church
held its position in England by prescription; it was the embodiment of the religious experience of the
English people over a long period of time."'). In discussions about disestablishment of the Anglican
Church an Archbishop commented that "the church is an essential part of the fabric of the
constitution of this country." Madeley, supra note 4, at 19 n.l 1. "[lIt remains the position of the
Labour government that it would not contemplate disestablishment of the Church of England unless
the Church itself wished it." Id. at 4 (internal quotations omitted). Throughout Europe, Christianity
is still the dominant religion. Id. at 11.
149. Schlafly, supra note 38, at 137. The Orthodox Church also takes on "a unique responsibility
for the Russian land and the Russian people." Id.
150. Id. at 138-39.
151. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 98, at 148. In addition, church leaders insist the renewal of
Russia post-Communism relies on the revival of the Orthodox faith. Schlafly, supra note 38, at 137.
Aleksii II, patriarch of the Orthodox church claimed that "the revival of Russia... is impossible
without reviving the Orthodox faith." Id. Three years later, "he linked the cultural identity of [the
Russian people with] their spiritual orientation." Id. (internal quotations omitted). He also insisted
that "with the state's failure to protect the spiritual-cultural identity of the people, the whole burden
of the struggle is placed upon the [Orthodox] Church." Id. (citations omitted).
913
"worship of God according to the Orthodox way."' 52  Many of the Russian
Orthodox holy sites are "linked with physical defense of the motherland
against the Latin West" which is a vital part of Russian culture and pride.
53
In post-Communist Russia, the Orthodox Church has attempted to resurrect
the "spiritual and cultural traditions of Holy Russia" through restoring and
rebuilding destroyed churches and monasteries.1
54
Several states have enacted statutes and constitutional provisions
recognizing "traditional" or "official" religions. 155 For example, in Belarus a
1996 constitutional referendum changed the wording of Article 16 of the
constitution. 156 The former Article 16 provided that "establishment of any
sort of advantages or restrictions for a religion or denomination in relation
to another religion or denomination is not allowed.' ' 157 However, the new
language states that "[relations between the State and religious
organizations shall be regulated by the law with regard to their influence on
the formation of the spiritual, cultural, and state traditions of the Belarusian
people.' 5 8  The new language no longer prohibits establishment of
advantages or restrictions on any religion or denomination but actually
allows legal regulation of religious organizations with regard to their
influence on the state traditions of the Belarusian people. 5 9 Under the
banner of national identity and "state traditions," the Belarus government
passed a revised religious registration law in 2002 that highlights the
"defining role of the Orthodox Church in the historical formation and
development of the spiritual, cultural and state traditions of the Belarusian
people," and also mentions the "inseparability from the general history of
the Belarusian people of the Lutheran Church, Judaism, and Islam."1 6°
152. Id. at 138.
153. Id. The Orthodox church "reclaim[s], resanctif[ies], and rebuild[s] churches and monasteries
closed or destroyed" under Communism to preserve Russian culture. Id.
154. id. (internal quotations omitted).
155. Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, in POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE, supra note 41, at 32 (noting in the preamble "Being cognizant of the Armenian Apostolic
Church as the national Church of the Armenian people and as an important bulwark for the
ediciation of its spiritual life and national preservation"); see also Religious Denominations Act, in
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE, supra note 41, at 77 (recognizing in the preamble "the special and
traditional role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of Bulgaria to establish and develop
its spirituality and culture"); see also Alexander Vashkevich, The Relationship of Church and State
in Belarus: Legal Regulation and Practice, 2003 BYU L. REV. 681, 708 (noting that Belarus grants
the "Russian Orthodox Church advantages and privileged status over other religious
denominations"); Diibeck, supra note 87, at 37 (pointing out that Article 4 of the Danish
Constitution states that "[t]he Evangelical Lutheran Church is the Danish National Church"); Canas,
supra note 71, at 261 (noting that "consecutive constitutional amendments, from 1935 (Law 1910) to
1971 [recognize] the Roman Catholic religion... 'as the traditional religion of the Portuguese
nation"').
156. Vashkevich, supra note 155, at 698.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 699 (emphasis added). Both the old and new Article 16 provide that all "religions and
faiths shall be equal before the law." Id.
159. Id.
160. Law on the Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations (2002) [Belarusi, in POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE, supra note 41, at 55; see also Vashkevich, supra note 155, at 704. The
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Like in Belarus, in Russia religious campaigns against "dangerous cults"
have drawn "national identities along religious lines," 161 often relying upon
the wording of the preamble to the 1997 Law on the Freedom of Conscience
and on Religious Associations. While the law follows the Russian
constitution in guaranteeing protection for all religious groups, the preamble
"recogniz[es] a special contribution made by Orthodoxy to the formation of
statehood in Russia and to the development of her spirituality and
culture .... ,,t62 The Orthodox concept of a "nation-church" and the idea
that "the people and the Christian community are identical or indissolubly
connected" often means that religious minorities are perceived as "serv[ing]
foreign gods in their own land," which leads some "to a conclusion that
there are 'wicked souls' amongst the people of God.' '163  Protection of
Russian national identity is a "major source of pressure to impose limitations
on foreign-based religious activity."' 64 For example, the U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom has reported that President Putin's
January 2000 security policy directive highlights the critical national
security need to "counteract[] ... the negative influence of foreign religious
organizations and missionaries."
1 65
Both industrial and religious monopolies rely on national identity and
prestige to gain protection. Like national airlines which are a source of pride
in Europe, official state churches bring a sense of national identity in many
countries. Further, just as AT&T insisted that the United States
telecommunications industry would fail if it were not protected, dominant
religions claim that they must be protected or "dangerous cults" will threaten
the moral well-being of the State and its citizens.
biggest concern for Belarus is the missionary work of "Catholic and Protestant organizations" that
has allowed "the existing number of Protestant communities [in 2000] to quadruple[] since 1989."
Id. at 704; see infra note 209-13 and accompanying text for discussion of religious registration laws
in Russia and Belarus.
161. Enyedi, supra note 41, at 157 (emphasis added). "[T]he influx of religious movements from
both the West and the East" exert pressure on Russian nationalism which has added to the "deeper
wounds [of] Russian national identity." Durham & Homer, supra note 14, at 3 (emphasis added).
Wounds to the Russian "psyche" have also resulted from "the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
deteriorating economic situation that followed in its wake." Id.
162. Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations (1997) [Russia], in POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE, supra note 41, at 279; KONST. RF. XIV (1993); see Vsevolod Chaplin, Law
and Church-State Relations in Russia: Position of the Orthodox Church, Public Discussion and the
Impact of Foreign Experience, in LAW AND RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 281 (Silvio
Ferrari & W. Cole Durham, eds. 2003).
163. Chaplin, supra note 162, at 286-88.
164. Durham & Homer, supra note 14, at 4 (commenting that "[flrom the perspective of internal
nationalism, the proliferation of new religious groups is perceived as exacerbating already intense
centripetal forces emanating from religious, ethnic and other inter-regional tensions"). Another
pressure causing Russian imposed limits on foreign religious organizations are "anti-foreign
attitudes" in Russia. Id. at 4.
165. Report on the Russian Federation, supra note 126, at 10.
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D. Foreign Dependence
Religious monopolies and industries both invoke fear of foreign
dependence in defending state protection. Industries, like AT&T, threatened
that granting contracts to foreign firms might result in a successful national
industry being overtaken by foreign competitors. Religions benefiting from
state protection similarly express fear that foreign religions invading their
territory will capture their followers, causing the state to become morally
dependent on foreign churches.
1. Industry
Industry advocates argue that state regulation and protection of industry
is the way to "prevent control of the [national] economy by foreign firms.
16 6
With the threat of breakup, AT&T relied on "heighten[ed] fears that foreign
manufacturers will be able to make new inroads in the U.S. market.'
167
However it was not just AT&T but also government officials who were
concerned about foreign dependence.t 6' For example, in 1981 AT&T
"awarded a $75 million contract to Fujitsu America Inc., ... [the California-
based] subsidiary of Japan's Fujitsu Ltd., to create a fiber-optics Long Lines
link between Boston and Washington, D.C. [because] Fujitsu had submitted
the lowest of 17 bids in open competition."' 69  However, the "contract
created a stir in Washington" and "AT&T withdrew the award-citing
'national interests'-and gave the contract to Western Electric."'' 70  One
industry commentator believed that AT&T awarded the contract to Fujitsu to
"hold the threat over Congress and the FCC that this great new technology is
going to the Japanese, just the way autos and steel have done... [aind they
fell for it.' 7 1 Further, he contends that this was a ploy since Western
Electric "could easily have submitted the low bid in the first place, aided by
subsidies from AT&T."
' 172
Even after the famous U.S. antitrust suit against AT&T, commentators
noted that the result of the break off of "local telephone companies rather
than Western Electric, the manufacturing arm of the Bell system" may have
been influenced by American concern with foreign competitiveness.
7 1
AT&T had contended that its breakup would "crush one of the few
internationally competitive companies that the U.S. has left... [and would
cause AT&T to] end up pleading for protection against the very foreign
166. White, supra note 48, at 20.
167. The Break-up-AT&T Trial Begins, supra note 114, at 84B.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (regarding this award to Western Electric, Victor Schnee, President of Probe Research
Inc., charged that "[tihey simply reached into the closet and brought out a foreign skeleton")
(internal quotations omitted).
171. Id. (regarding comment by Richard Moley, a Vice President at ROLM Corp., Santa Clara a
leading manufacturer of digital PBX (private branch exchange) systems).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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competition that the Bell System now trounces." 17 4 During the breakup,
policy makers feared competition from international competitors like
"Canada's Northern Telecom, Japan's NEC, Hitachi and Fujitsu."'1
75
2. Religious Analogues
Religious monopolies claim that without state protection, foreign
churches will invade church territory and society will become dependant on
foreign churches. A dominant state church may even assert that it has sole
"spiritual rights" to the state.176  The Russian Orthodox Church has
complained that foreign religions proselytize on the "canonical territory" of
the Church. 177  In recent years, the Russian government has denied an
increasing number of visas to foreign religious workers and expelled
foreign-born Catholic bishops, in an attempt to limit the influx of foreign
religions and implement the policy of "one city one bishop," which allows
"only one bishop--from the Russian Orthodox Church-in any city.,,'178
Domestic religions are often threatened by "[t]he appearance of financially-
robust foreign religious groups" threatening "financially-ailing" domestic
churches that foreign religions are "'purchasing souls' at the expense of [a
state's] culture."'179 Archpriest Vladimir Kharitonov of Russia said that his
"chief anxiety" was "the invasion of Russia by various cults, and new
religions."'' 80  Church commentators have insisted that domestic churches
cannot compete with foreign funded religions. 8 ' Protestant and Catholic
groups in Russia have been charged with being foreign spies 82 and using
174. Id. After the AT&T "breakup," Western Electric still enjoyed "roughly two thirds of each
year's telephone equipment sales in America... [with even higher shares] of switching apparatus."
Stripping Ma Bell, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1982, at 13.
175. Id.
176. Gross, supra note 128, at 720
177. Schlafly, supra note 38, at 155.
178. Report on the Russian Federation, supra note 126, at 9.
179. Gross, supra note 128, at 719-20 (demonstrating Russian citizens' threat from foreign
religions as "betrayal of 'Russian-ness').
180. Schlafly, supra note 38, at 136.
181. Gross, supra note 128, at 720; Cava, supra note 14, at 535 (noting that the Orthodox Church
is financially unable to compete with well-funded foreign churches). In Poland, Orthodox Church
leaders have also argued for "tighter control of the [non-Orthodox] 'sects."' Anderson, supra note 5,
at 147 (noting that in some "rural areas [in Poland, problems arose] where clerical influences
sometimes lead to expressions of hostility towards minority groups").
182. See, e.g., Sergei Kazovsky, Strangers Among Our Own, Russkii Kurier, Aug. 2, 2004,
available at http://www.stetson.edul-psteeves/relnews/0408a.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005)
(describing a local campaign to label Mormon members as American spies); Russian Jesuits
Struggle for Rights, Mir Religii, May 12, 2001, available at http://www.stetson.edu/-psteeves/
relnews/0105b.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) (describing the Russian "popular tradition" of
labeling Jesuits as Vatican spies); Pavel Zaiakin, International Report from Evangelical Lutheran
Mission of Khakasia, Sept. 25, 1998, available at http://www.stetson.edu/-psteeves/relnews/
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humanitarian aid to entice people away from "the Russian state, national
traditions, and culture."'1 83 Foreign religions proselytizing in Latin America
have also been accused of being "in the service of foreign powers,"' 1 4 for
fear that they are invading not only church territory but the state's
independence. One Latin American Roman Catholic cardinal described the
majority of protestants in his country as "here on the initiative of the United
States."' 85 In Belarus, the government has tightened controls over entrance
of foreign clergy, 8 6 and in Sweden its limits on religious liberty have
extended to the country's immigration policy. 18 7 Perhaps the most famous
example of concern about foreign influence on religion is the People's
Republic of China, where there are only a handful of recognized religions,
all controlled by the Communist Party, which insists they are "free" because
they are free from foreign control or influence.
88
From a U.S. perspective, it is useful to remember that fears of the power
of foreign-based religions also have some history in the United States. John
F. Kennedy faced numerous questions in the 1960 presidential campaign
about his loyalty to the Vatican, until he finally made a statement before the
Greater Houston Ministerial Association that he would make decisions as
president "without regard to outside religious pressure or dictate."'
' 89
The fear of foreign domination has been used effectively by industries
and religions. Like AT&T warning that without protection, the United
States would lose another successful industry to the Japanese, Catholic
leaders in Latin American countries and Orthodox leaders in Russia warn
that without protection their "canonical territory" will be lost to foreign
funded proselytizing religions.
9809c.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) (quoting local government official as stating that all
Lutherans are American spies).
183. Report on the Russian Federation, supra note 126, at 7.
184. Michael S. Serrill, What the Pope Will Find: John Paul 11 Returns to a Region where
Catholic Marxism Is Out of Favor: The Big Threat: Evangelicals, 147 TIME INT'L 7, Feb. 12, 1996,
available at 1996 WL 8824716, at *3.
185. Edward L. Cleary, The Catholic Church, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EVANGELIZATION IN
LATIN AMERICA 11, 22 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1999).
186. Vashkevich, supra note 155, at 708 (noting the "tightening control over the invitation of
foreign clergy" in Belarus and that the nationalist nature of this legislation is demonstrated when the
limits are most severely imposed on foreign religions). Commentators have asserted that the late
nineteenth century U.S. legislation, the Alien Contract Labor Act "intentionally [rather than
inadvertently] prohibited foreign clergy from coming to the United States to work" by not making an
exception for clergy. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2424-25
(2003). A federal prosecutor asserted that "no department of service has competition been more
active than in clerical work. Our choicest and most desirable metropolitan pulpits are invaded by the
foreign product. Eight of the best-paying and best-attended churches in New York are at the present
time served by imported... clergymen." Parsons Need Protection, supra note 39, at 9.
187. Alwall, supra note 142, at 196 (pointing out the interrelation between Sweden's strongly
assimilationist immigration policy and religious climate).
188. Brett G. Scharffs & W. Cole Durham, Foreword to KIM-KWONG CHAN & ERIC R. CARLSON,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CHINA: POLICY, ADMINISTRATION, AND REGULATION - A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK (Gordon Melton, ed., 2005)
189. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, LIFT EVERY VOICE: A REPORT ON RELIGION IN
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 11, available at http://pewforum.org/publications/reports~lifteveryvoice.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
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IV. ASSERTED BENEFITS OF STATE PROTECTION TO CITIZENS
In addition to claiming benefits for the state and society, industry and
religious advocates claim that state protection benefits citizens. These
arguments take two primary forms. First, industrial monopolies insist that
regulation by the state protects consumers from fraud and manipulation by
unscrupulous promoters. Religious monopolies similarly argue that
protectionist measures, including registration requirements for foreign
religions and anti-proselytism legislation protect citizens from fraudulent
cults. Second, defenders argue that state protection should continue in
industries which provide services, such as farming, that are fundamental to
the culture and well-being of the general citizenry. States also insist that
fundamental traditions, such as a dominant religion, must be preserved for
the benefit of citizens.
A. Protection from Fraud of Unscrupulous Promoters
States justify protection of both industries and religions through
claiming that citizens need state protection respectively from the fraud of
unscrupulous promoters and dangerous cults. In the industrial arena, states
may justify protection through a legitimate interest in protecting its
consumers from fraud. States also insist on limiting the access of foreign
religions to citizens, through foreign registration or anti-proselytism laws.
States also closely investigate foreign religions and refuse to grant
disfavored religions the same advantages received by favored religions. 90
1. Industry
States often insist that protection of an industry is vital to protecting
consumers from fraud. States have traditionally regulated many areas where
they uphold "a legitimate interest in the protection of ... [their] people
against fraud and deception."' 19' While simple state regulation would suffice
to protect consumers, states may insist that additional protectionist measures
are necessary to protect consumers.
190. See Roman Podoprigora, Discertionary State Approval of Religious Activity, in
FACILITATING FREEDOM, supra note 44, at 435, 436 (describing Austria's refusal to recognize
Jehovah's Witnesses because of "their intolerant attitude towards government... and the fact that
the church would be led from Brooklyn, New York").
191. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963) (noting that states
have traditionally had the right to regulate "sale of food products at retail markets within their
borders") (internal quotations omitted).
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2. Religious Analogues
States claim that through protection of religious monopolies they are
protecting citizens from fraud of so-called dangerous cults.192 States may
pass registration requirements to make it difficult to establish a foreign
church or pass anti-proselytism legislation to stop foreign religions from
taking advantage of their citizens. 193  For example, in Greece, the
government defends criminal prohibitions against proselytism through
claiming that the government retains a right to "protect a person's religious
beliefs and dignity."' 94 The Greek government considers proselytizing by
minority religions an attempt to influence citizens "by immoral and deceitful
means." 195 In addition, proselytism has been referred to as an attempt to
"brainwash[]" and "violate individual [citizens'] consciences."' 196  The
European Court of Human Rights has limited Greek attempts to prevent
proselytizing in Kokkinakis, 197 but even facially neutral bars to proselytizing
may be used discriminatorily against minority religions.' 98 In Kokkinakis,
for example, the applicant claimed that under the Greek law it would surpass
"even the wildest academic hypothesis" to imagine, for example, the
possibility of a complaint being made by a Catholic priest or by a Protestant
clergyman against an Orthodox Christian who had attempted to entice one of
his flock away from him. It was even less likely that an Orthodox Christian
would be prosecuted for proselytizing on behalf of the "dominant
religion."' 99
Another increasingly common method of "protecting" citizens against
the supposed harms of new and minority religions is the formation of "cult"
or "sect" observatories and the creation of lists of so-called "cults" or
"sects." Belgium has formed a center for information and advice on harmful
sectarian movements2°°  and the Belarusian government formed a
government committee to "concentrate its efforts on stopping the activity of
192. Barker, supra note 123, at 583 (discussing protection of consumers in the religious
marketplace by governments allegedly protecting against fraud and misrepresentation); Willy Fautrd
et al., The Sect Issue in the European Francophone Sphere, in FACILITATING FREEDOM, supra note
44, at 602--08 (detailing initatives in Belgium and Switzerland to protect their citizens from cults).
193. Barker, supra note 123, at 586-87.
194. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 42 (1993).
195. Id. See also Larissis and Others v. Greece, App. Nos. 23372/94, 26377/94, 26378/94, 27
Eur. H.R. Rep. 329, 27 (1998). The Greek anti-proselytism law proscribes that:
proselytism... is ... any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a
person of a different religious persuasion (eterodoxos), with the aim of undermining
those beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral
support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of the other
person's inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety.
Id. (emphasis added).
196. Larissis, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 (Valticos, J., dissenting) (noting that proselytism is
"incompatible with freedom of opinion, which is a fundamental human right").
197. Kokkinakis, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397.
198. Barker, supra note 123, at 586-87.
199. Kokkinakis, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, at 29.
200. See supra note 192.
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neomystical, destructive sects. ' ,20' This committee categorized Orthodox,
Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Islamic faiths as "traditional" faiths and other
faiths, including Protestantism, as "non-traditional., 20 2 Numerous Western
European countries and organizations, including Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, France, Belgium, the Council of Europe, and the European
Parliament have had study commissions and have issued reports addressing
alleged dangers of new religious movements.2 °3 The French and Belgian
11204
reports concluded with lists of over a hundred so-called "sects.
To protect its citizens from the fraud of "psycho cults," the German
government also instituted government investigations of some foreign
religious activities. The German government, through "constitutional
protection agencies," "track[s] and sometimes infiltrate[s] movements
suspected of working against Germany's... constitution., 20 5 The German
ruling party claims that its "constitution is ... under attack from the
religious minorities and so-called psycho cults that are gaining strength at
the expense of the established Lutheran and Catholic state churches.,
20 6
Dominant churches have also initiated anti-cult media campaigns. One
tactic of the Russian Orthodox Church in deterring its members from joining
new foreign religions is through "using the media to introduce into Russian
society ... characteristically anti-cult concepts, language and images." 207
Although not part of an official anti-cult campaign, in Guatemala, a Catholic
201. Vashkevich, supra note 155, at 700. The Committee was called the Belarus State Committee
of Religious and National Affairs (SCRNA) and was directed by the Council of Ministers. Id. In
June 1997, the Council of Ministers also prohibited "organization of summer camps for children and
teenagers by "unregistered religious organizations." Id. In addition, only religious associations have
the right "to establish their own mass media, invite foreign citizens to conduct religious activities,
create religious schools for training priests, divines, and church staff, and establish cloisters and
monastic communities." Id. at 705.
202. Id. at 700. The SCRNA also considers Asian faiths as nontraditional.
203. Barker, supra note 123, at 584-85.
204. Rapport fait au nora de la commission d'enqu~te sur les sects [France], supra note 93;
Duquesne & Luc Williams, Enquire parliamentaire visant 4 ilabore une politique en vue de lutte
contre les practiques illgale des sectes et le danger qu'elles reprsentent pour le socidtd et pour les
personnes particulirement les mineurs d'dge (1997) [Belgium], available at http://users.skynet.be/
wihogora/r-sectes.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
205. Davis, supra note 94, at 110 (noting also that Germany's constitution "states that the freedom
of belief and conscience and the freedom to possess religious and philosophical beliefs are
inviolable").
206. Id. at 110. The German "Commission of Inquiry" has been formed to investigate state
threats from "sects and psycho-cults." Id. at 122. Many also describe a "climate of intolerance [in
Germany] toward religious minorities." Id.
207. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 98, at 157. The anti-cult language includes "brainwashing,
mind control, destructive cult, totalitarian sect." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Images include
"zombies, broken families, [and] crime." Id. The local media (located in the provinces as opposed
to the "central media" located in the largest cities) has especially incited horror about "foreign
religions." Id. at 159.
Archbishop, resentful of Protestant success in attracting converts, claimed
that "evangelical teachings are the opium of the masses." 208
Registration laws are also often used to "protect" against minority
religions and limit their access to legal entity status. Registration is required
as a prerequisite to any religious activity in much of Central Asia and in
China.209  Registration laws also may limit registration of religious
organizations to dominant groups through facially neutral requirements such
as excessively high numbers of members or the requirement of an extended
period of existence in the country. 2'0 The Belarus government denied some
nontraditional faiths permission to "legally register at the national level, 2 1'
"endanger[ing]" the "existence" of many faiths. 21 2 Russia has also passed
legislation requiring foreign religious organizations to register with the
government, supporting a widely-held belief that "foreign religious
organizations and new religious movements defraud the spiritually feeble
[and] brainwash vulnerable youth. 21 3
In both industrial and religious arenas, those vying for state protection
assert that they need protectionist legislation to protect vulnerable citizens
from fraud of "psycho cults" and unscrupulous promoters.
208. Sen-ill, supra note 184, at *3.
209. Durham, supra note 44, at 321 (describing how religious registration laws are often used as
methods of control of minority religions); International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Islam and the
State, Report No. 59, July 10, 2003, available at http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=
1442&1=1 (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) (noting that he has observed "over the past
decade.., a troubling drift away from a robust and vibrant protection of religious freedom in a
growing number of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) states"). He also
noted that "some OSCE countries [including Western European countries like Austria] have
developed new laws and regulations that serve as a roadblock to the free exercise of religious
belief." Id. at 2.
210. Durham, supra note 44, at 388-92 (giving examples such as Slovakia's requirement of
20,000 members and Russia's requirement of 15 years' presence in the country to establish a
centralized religious organization); W. Cole Durham Jr. et al., A Comparative Analysis of Religious
Association Laws in Post-Communist Europe, in LAW AND RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE,
supra note 162, at 330 (providing other examples).
211. Vashkevich, supra note 155, at 700. The SCNRA regulations have had an impact on limiting
the activities of nontraditional religions as Full Gospel Pentecostal churches are "regularly refused
registration." Id. at 702. Members of the Krishna Church have been evicted from their homes
because they have been using private property to worship without "special permission from the local
authorities." Id. at 702-03.
212. Id. at 704. The "Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, the Union of Evangelical Faith
Christians, the Association of Communities of Full Gospel Christians, and the Conference of
Christian Adventists condemned the bill saying it would favor some religious organizations and limit
opportunities for worship." Id. Other limitations include "requiring permission to conduct religious
processions outside temples." Id. at 708.
213. Gross, supra note 128, at 720. Protectionist measures are often a result of public outcry for
legislation to protect them from "dangerous" "sects and cults." Id. at 718. Shterin & Richardson,
supra note 98, at 157. The anti-cult language includes "brainwashing, mind control, destructive cult,
totalitarian sect." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Images include "zombies, broken families, [and]
crime." Id. The local media (located in the provinces as opposed to the "central media" located in
the largest cities) has especially incited horror about "foreign religions." Id. at 159.
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B. Fundamental Nature of Product or Service
Both religious and industrial monopolies rely on the fundamental nature
of the industry or religion of a country to justify protectionism. Just as states
sometimes insist that protection of key industries, such as steel,
telecommunications, and airlines are fundamental to the functioning of their
state, states justify protection of religion by claiming that their traditional
church-state relationship relies on state protection. The closest analogy to
religion in the industrial sector is farming, which like religion has been
considered vital to citizens' traditions and "moral character."
1. Industry
State-controlled industries have been justified because of the
fundamental nature of certain industrial products and services. In the United
States, it was common for states in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to own
industries of "industrial and service enterprises in key sectors, such as steel,
telecommunications, fertilizers, automobiles, petrochemicals, hotels, airlines
and banking. 21 4 Often in these areas governments officially created public
monopolies to justify state protection.1 5 The U.S. government also
supported cartelization in "transportation, natural resource industries, and
retail trade," as a means of protection.1 6
States often consider agriculture as one of the most fundamental parts of
their economy because of its importance for sustenance but also because of
the moral importance of farming to a society. The U.S. government
subsidized exports in agriculture and developed "marketing quotas and
special penalty taxes" for products such as "tobacco, cotton and potatoes. 21 7
The government justified protectionist policies because it claimed that since
agriculture was "the fundamental economic activity upon which all others
rested," the "balance of market power between agriculture and industry"
could not be maintained until agriculture was regulated.21 8 Along with the
"fundamental" nature of farming to the U.S. economy, it was also
fundamental to the American moral character.21 9 Protectionists relied on the
fact that "political symbols of the family farm and the yeoman farmer, the
214. White, supra note 48, at 20.
215. See, e.g., Merrill Sheils & William J. Cook, NEWSWEEK, A Giant Eyes New Vistas, Feb. 25,
1980 (describing the implications of the breakup of the public monopoly, AT&T).
216. HAWLEY, supra note 32, at 15 (also pointing out that in the mid-1930s there were
"oligopolistic understandings" or "cartel agreements" which "eliminated price competition" in
industries such as "automobiles, chemicals, motion pictures, farm implements, aluminum, cigarettes,
newsprint, anthracite coal, glass containers, optics, lead, sulphur and tin plate").
217. Id. at 192 (internal quotations omitted).
218. Id.
219. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
923
sturdy, honest, independent, morally upright individual" constituted "the
very foundation of America's individualistic and democratic ideals.
2 0
Farming as an occupation was deemed to be "somehow purer, cleaner, and
morally better than other occupations" and "[t]o many people, farmers and
non-farmers alike, it justified the salvation of farming as a way of life."221
The moral argument to protect farming also spread to "food-processing
industries. '222  This argument has been adopted by industries in serving
other "fundamental" services such as telecommunications. AT&T provides a
good example of an industry player who insisted that without state
protection, it could not make its vital services223 available to the general
public 224 at an affordable price.225 Some defenders simply contend that state
220. Id.
221. Id. (noting also that this support of the moral and fundamental nature of farming "explained
in part why agriculture was able to dodge most of the anti-monopoly agitation and find ways of
using government powers to fix prices, plan production, and regularize markets"); see also id. at 482
(noting that "[t]he country, so it was said, could not be prosperous unless its farmers were
prosperous").
222. Id. at 482 ("Monopolistic arrangements in certain food-processing industries could be
camouflaged as an essential part of the farm program.").
223. Industries claim that state protected industries make vital services available to the general
citizenry. See, e.g., TEMIN & GALAMBOS, supra note 112, at 11 (stating that Congress passed the
Communications Act to "make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a
rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication services with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges") (internal quotations omitted).
For example, AT&T Chairman deButts explained that AT&T felt "an unusual obligation to see
to it that the service shall at all times be adequate, dependable and satisfactory." Id. at 97 (internal
quotations omitted). Chairman deButts claimed that "AT&T also had an obligation ... to oppose
competition and favor regulation .. " Id. He also claimed that "universal service" was the key to
the Bell's "grand system." Hearings on Communications, supra note 130, at 19 (statement of
Chairman deButts). DeButts also testified before Congress that he "grew up in the Bell System
believing in the company's obligation to serve all the people and to maintain the ability to provide
that service." Merrill Brown, Ex-ATT Head: I Tried to be Competitive; Ex-ATT Chief: We Worried
About Network, Competition, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1981, at D10 (internal quotations omitted).
AT&T also claimed that "the goal of the Bell System was service, subject only to the requirement
that it earn a reasonable profit." TEMIN & GALAMBOS, supra note 112, at 98 (stating that Gifford
and deButts both made this assertion). DeButts further claimed that threats to breakup AT&T
contradicted "the basic aim of the United States telecommunications policy ... that is the widest
availability of high-quality communications service at the lowest cost to the entire public."
Hearings on Communications, supra note 130, at 10 (statement of Chairman deButts).
224. DeButts also warned Congress that "[bly fragmenting responsibility for service, they
jeopardize its quality... [and] [b]y forcing rates for basic service up, they restrict its availability to
the average American." Hearings on Communications, supra note 130, at 10, 11 (statement of
Chairman deButts) (claiming also that he appeared in Congress to "protect the interest of our
customers" and support the goal of making "telephone service as widely affordable as possible").
Chairman deButts also warned Congressmen that AT&T had "faced competition before and it was
very nearly destroyed by it." Id. at 12. He explained that after "Bell's patents [expired] in the
1890's, rival telephone companies battled for the same territory ... [resulting in] [pirice-cutting
[which] produced wretched service and customers [having to] subscribe to two or more companies to
reach all the people in the community in which they lived." Id.
225.. Rather than focusing on the harms to the companies, industry defenders often focus on
harm to vulnerable consumers. In defending AT&T against competition, Chairman deButts also
contended that the "inevitable result of competition would be an increase in the rates which existing
carriers would have to charge for residential service." Brown, supra note 223, at D10 (internal
quotations omitted). He insisted that the result would be increased costs on the "local ratepayer."
TEMIN & GALAMBOS, supra note 112, at 98. In opposition to the Telecommunications Act of 1980
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protection serves "the public interest. ''2 6 Even in recent years, various
nations still maintain that fundamental products or services are best provided
to the public through "strong government involvement.227
2. Religious Analogues
Some countries justify granting advantages to a religious monopoly by
relying on the fundamental nature of a religion to citizens. Often states rely
on historical importance of a religion to citizens' tradition and culture to
justify protection.228 Orthodoxy, in particularly, has drawn on a theological
tradition of a "territorial understanding of faith," which would exclude other
Christian religions from proselytizing in their lands.229 In 2002, a Belarusian
law recognized "the defining role of the Orthodox Church in the historical
formation and development of spiritual, cultural, and state traditions of the
Belarusian people. 230  Establishment of the fundamental nature of the
which aimed to deregulate AT&T, a commentator argued that it would result in an "increase in local
service charges" of over "$20 per month for each residential and small business customer."
Hearings on H.R. 6121 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 302, 302-03 (1980) [hereinafter Hearings on Monopolies] (noting that if
the "legislation were to be enacted in its present form, small telephone customers would suffer
extremely burdensome increases in basic rates in the future").
226. Michael Isikoff, Sprint Suit Against ATT Dismissed, WASH. POST, June 27, 1984, at C6. In
the suit brought by Southern Pacific Communications Corp. against AT&T alleging monopolization
of the long-distance telephone market, a lower court judge, Charles R. Richey was accused by the
Court of Appeals of expressing "his personal policy view that an AT&T monopoly, and not
competition, is in the public interest." Id.
227. Lando, supra note 50, at 2184, 2190 (citing France as an example because "the government
pioneered the Minitel to provide a two-way text-link in three million homes" and noting that France
Telecom retains a strong monopoly in many areas, and has made only minimal allowances of open
competition despite a 1991 public law which privatized it). Germany has also relied heavily on
government-owned monopoly providers for telecommunications services and still allows voice
telephony monopoly in telecommunications services. Id. at 2191, 2192. In general, up until 1994
"[sitate owned monopolies still controlled] the majority of EC [European Community] telephone
services and each EC Member State (except for Britain) still offer[ed] 'exclusive rights' to a single
telecommunications company." Id. at 2196-97.
228. See supra Part IlI-A-2.
229. Mark Elliott & Sharyl Corrado, The 1997 Russian Law on Religion: The Impact on
Protestants, 27 RELIGION, STATE & SOC. 109, 120 (1999); see also Vigen Guroian, Evangelism and
Mission in the Orthodox Tradition, in SHARING THE BOOK: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE
RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF PROSELYTISM 231, 240 (John Witte, Jr. & Richard C. Martin eds., 1999)
(describing the "corporate and organic concepts of church and peoplehood embraced by Orthodox
theology").
230. Vashkevich, supra note 155, at 704 (emphasis added). The law also recognized the
"spiritual, cultural, and historical role of the Roman Catholic Church in the territory of Belarus" as
well as the "inseparability form the general history of the Belarusian people of the Lutheran Church,
Judaism, and Islam." Id. (citations omitted).
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Orthodox Church in Belarus justifies state protectionist policies. 231 Russian
traditional thinking perceives "the church body, society, and the state as a
single whole," where church-nation takes priority over individuals. 232 Some
religions, such as the Church of Sweden, have simply claimed that their
traditional church systems are "incompatible with religious liberty. 233
Often, religion has been seen as a vital cultural carrier and thus preserving a
national religion is associated with retaining a sense of culture, nation, and
community. Makau Mutua has described how "religion is often the first
point of attack in the process of acculturation" and the destruction of
communities, particularly in African history.23
Both religions and industries rely on the fundamental nature of their
particular industry or religion to the state in order to gain protection. Just as
state protection of farming was justified because it epitomized the
democratic ideals upon which America was founded, Orthodoxy in Russia
has been protected because of its historical importance to citizens, tradition
and culture.
V. HARMS OF PROTECTIONISM FOR INDUSTRIAL MONOPOLIES AND
RELIGIOUS MONOPOLIES, STATE AND SOCIETY, AND CITIZENS
This section suggests that not only are arguments for protection made by
religious and industrial monopolies typically of dubious strength, but that
protectionism actually often harms the three constituents it purports to
benefit.
A. Harms of Protectionist Measures for Industrial Monopolies
While industrial and religious monopolies argue and agitate for their
own protection and importance, lessons from industry suggest that
protection rarely creates the advantages sought. The asserted advantages
often do not transpire and protection of religion and industry may actually
231. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text for discussion of Belarusian protectionist
legislation.
232. Chaplin, supra note 162, at 286-87.
233. Goran Gustafsson, Church-State Separation Swedish-Style, in CHURCH AND STATE, supra
note 4, at 51, 56 (describing a proposal by four members of the Riksdag in 1956 about the
relationship between the Church of Sweden and the state). In 1972 a government-established
committee suggested that Sweden should treat "all religious associations" equally and stop
"preferential treatment of any denomination, including the Church of Sweden." Stegeby, supra note
14, at 722. However, the government faced with an "impending election" declared in 1973 that "it
did not intend to recommend any substantial changes to the existing church-state relationship." Id.
234. Makau Mutua, Proselytism and Cultural Integrity, in FACILITATING FREEDOM, supra note
44, at 651, 666. Mutua states that
[Ulnless groups are given protection against invasion and control by others, their cultural
and ethnic identities could be quashed by more powerful cultures and political systems.
The violent advocacy of proselytizing religions in Africa could be seen as a negation of
this right particularly because religion is often the first point of attack in the process of
acculturation.
Id.; see also PROSELYTIZATION AND COMMUNAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN AFRICA (Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1999).
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lead to less efficient industries, less autonomy for religious organizations,
and possibly oppressive dominant religions.
1. Less Efficient Industry
Industrial protection including state control and regulation, quotas, and
non-tariff barriers may actually create less efficient industries. In passing
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Congress recognized that monopolies create
inefficiency and attempted to avoid this through antitrust laws. 235 The
current economic consensus also asserts that state ownership, control and
regulation of industries is "less efficient than privately held commercial
entities.'236 This has been confirmed by the success of newly privatized
state-operated industries in France, Italy, and Spain.237 The result of state
protection is often "little or no funding for research and development to
improve efficiencies or services" as well as "over employment and low
productivity. 238  Protectionism also prevents the shielded industry "from
building the necessary skills to compete successfully in the global
235. Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191, 1191-92, 1213 (1977) (pointing out that Congress
recognized efficiency as a "central goal of antitrust" but concluding that equity is another goal of
antitrust).
236. White, supra note 48, at 20 (noting that "state-owned enterprises" "are protected from
competition through government regulations that grant them monopoly power in key sectors" and
that World Bank studies of the "performance changes for a combined sample of two hundred eleven
companies, from fifty industries [from both developing and industrialized countries] over a period of
more than twenty years" reports "substantial increases in sales, profitability, capital investments and
operating efficiency in the privatized companies and industries" as well as a "slight increase, on
average in the number of employees after privatization"). In addition, White points out a New York
University study of "one hundred twenty-eight privatized firms and ninety" state owned-industries in
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland where researchers found "immediate increases in revenues
and productivity following privatization." Id. at 20. He further points out other benefits to
privatization which include: more capital for technology, training and investment, management free
of political constraints, fiscal stability, capital market development, more social programs by
governments who no longer use state resources to support industry, and increased attraction of
foreign investment. Id. at 20-21.
In the mid-1930s planners posited that "the antitrust approach of breaking down and destroying
concentrated economic power was outmoded, impractical, and undesirable" and would "impair
efficiency and lower the standard of living"). HAWLEY, supra note 32, at 175.
237. White, supra note 48, at 20. White pointed out that
in 1997 proceeds from selling state-owned enterprises worldwide hit a record $162
billion. France, Italy and Spain all launched huge, popular and very successful public
share issue privatizations. Telecom Italia's $15 billion offering in November 1997 was
the largest in European history ... [and] France Telecom and the multiple Spanish
offerings from Telefonica and Argentaria likewise transformed share ownership patterns
in their countries.
Id. In the Czech Republic, "twenty thousand small businesses" were sold in public auctions. Id. at
23.
238. White, supra note 48, at 20.
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market. '239  Further, exclusion of foreign products and quotas "limit the
vigor of existing competitors. 24 ° In addition, the countries with the most
successful privatization in Eastern Europe are the countries without any
protections from foreign investors.241 Even in revealing the harm to U.S.
industries caused by foreign protection, rather than urging policymakers to
weaken antitrust laws, industry specialists and congresspersons argued that
the answer was increased enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws
internationally.242 Industry experts insisted that free competition was best
for American business. 243
A comparison between the United States airline industry and the
European airline industry demonstrates the potential harms of state
protection. Since the 1920s, the United States airline industry existed as
"[g]overnment-organized cartels."'244 The United States government stopped
protection of the U.S. airline industry throughout the 1980s. 245 By 1990,
after privatization of the airline industry, "the number of passenger-miles" in
the U.S. domestic airline industry "had increased by 95%" and "[flares had
fallen about 20% in real terms. 246 Commentators point out that the growth
of the industry had been stunted by state regulation.247 Throughout the
1990s, European airlines faced trouble competing with deregulated
American airlines with the surge in international travel since European
airlines were "still bloated and inefficient government-owned companies. 248
239. Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Liberalizing International Trade in Legal Services: A
Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 941,953 (1995).
240. Mark Crane, The Future Direction of Antitrust, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 6-7 (1987) (adding also
that "[d]umping decrees exclude low-price products"). Economically, one harm of state protection is
"public-sector deficits and foreign-debt burdens" resulting from government subsidization. White,
supra note 48, at 20 (adding also that "governments in these circumstances borrow heavily or print
money to cover these costs, which leads to high inflation, the discouragement of further investment
and resultant capital flight" and this may eventually lead to an inability to "compete in the
international marketplace").
241. White, supra note 48, at 25 (noting that "[slome of the most successful privatizations in
Eastern Europe strongly encouraged foreign investors").
242. Hearings on Antitrust, supra note 58, at 1 (statement of Senator Metzenbaum) ("For too
long, we in the United States have tolerated unfair foreign competition which attacks our industries,
robs America of jobs, and undermines our global competitiveness."). The Act would not allow
industries "to take advantage of weak or nonexistent competition law enforcement in their home
markets to compete unfairly in markets that do have strong competition laws and effective
enforcement." Id. at 136 (Appendix).
243. Industry specialists insisted that American businesses were "most responsive when.., under
the heat of competition, including foreign competition." Hearings on Antitrust, supra note 58, at
105 (statement of Eleanor Fox).
244. Don't Coddle or Curb Them; The Pain in the World's Airline Industry Can Best Be Eased by
More American-Style Deregulation, Not Less, supra note 134, at 18.
245. Id.
246. Id. (also noting that "[plassengers had saved more than $100 billion on their tickets and
enjoyed far more choice" but also pointing out that American officials failed to enforce antitrust
rules in the airline industry allowing, by 1991, "90% of America's domestic passenger traffic [to be]
carried by the eight largest airlines").
247. Id.
248. Richard M. Weintraub, Flying High Over Europe; U.S. Airlines Gain Ground as
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When European airlines finally privatized throughout the 1990s, many were
better able to compete internationally. 249  Lufthansa President Juergen
Weber commented in 1993 that "[h]ad Europe been deregulated 15 years
ago, we would have been [more competitive]. 25°
While some commentators still tout the benefits of some form of state
protectionism, most do not encourage "monopolistic protectionism.,
251
Many countries have recognized that "excessive protection from foreign
competition" and state subsidies are "outdated attitudes" that need to be
eliminated to achieve "economic modernization.
2152
2. Lack of Religious Organization Autonomy and Religious Oppression
Two potential harms resulting from state protection of religious
monopolies include lack of autonomy of religious groups and religious
oppression from the dominant religion.25 3  First, when a state grants extra
protections to a religion, the religion becomes increasingly dependant on the
state and autonomy is often sacrificed. 4  A religion may "lose its
identity... and become merely an agency of the state. 2 55 In established or
Deregulation Strains International Treaties, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at H01 (stating that
American airlines were deregulated in the 1980s).
249. Id.
250. Id. However he also noted that "even then it would not be the same [since] half of all the
passengers who fly take off and land in the United States," giving U.S. airlines an advantage. Id.
251. See, e.g., BATRA, supra note 14, at 61 (arguing against free trade and for "competitive
protectionism" which allows domestic monopolies to be broken up while still allowing them to be
protected from foreign competition as opposed to "monopolistic protectionism" which protects a
domestic firm from foreign and domestic competition).
252. Gabriel Garcia, Comment, Economic Development and the Course of Intellectual Property
Protection in Mexico, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 701, 723 n.81 (1992) (italics omitted) (quoting Mexican
President Salinas' goals in modernizing Mexican economic policies which include easing
restrictions on foreign investment in Mexico). Id. at 728. Despite the importance of protecting jobs
and maintaining strategic industries for defense purposes, many commentators insist that state
protectionist actions harm the economy. Crane, supra note 240, at 7, 19.
253. Another harm of state protection of dominant religions may actually be inefficiency of the
dominant religion. Just like state protected European airlines that had trouble competing with
privatized U.S. airlines, dominant religions receiving state protection may have trouble competing
with new religions. A dominant church receiving government aid may be slow to respond to the
needs of adherents, meanwhile losing members to new innovative churches. This phenomenon, if it
is occurring at all, is of course difficult to pinpoint. In addition, it makes an assumption that an
individual's choice of a religion is like her choice of an airline ticket. This assumption is not one we
are willing to make.
254. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217-1348
(contrasting three different conceptions of autonomy and their implications for church-state
relations).
255. Gustafsson, supra note 233, at 54 (documenting a 1929 proposal by bishops that "the church,
while retaining its position as an established state-church, should become less dependent on the
state"); Central Asia: Islam and the State, supra note 209 (describing how Central Asian
governments "use Islam as a conduit to promote their own ideologies and campaigns, and in general
dominant religious organizations, governments are often involved in the
appointment of religious leaders.256 Greece and Bulgaria, for example, have
tried to intervene in the selection of the Muslim leadership in their countries,
but these attempts have been rejected by the European Court of Human
Rights.257  Increased financial support for dominant religions often
corresponds with increasing regulation and government interference in
decisionmaking, undermining religious autonomy. 258  The state may also
exert pressure on religious leaders and withhold funds or allow protectionist
legislation to coerce the church to do its will.25 9 The church may lose its
ability to guide its members according to independent inspiration but instead
be guided by the coercive influence of the state. In the process of
disestablishing the Church of Sweden, proponents argued that the vibrancy
of a religion is undermined by government control, even if designed for
beneficial reasons.26 ° Control by the state lessens the authenticity of the
religious voice and ultimately reduces the effectiveness of both the religious
message and the religion's work as a governmental tool: "[t]he more the
government controls it, the less authority the religious hierarchy has with
believers, and the less impact it has on carrying government ideology to the
population.
' 26 1  a
Second, a religious monopoly may become oppressive and with state aid
stifle minority religions.262 Religious persecution may be the final result of a
state sanctioned protection of a dominant religion. In Germany,
commentators document a cycle of religious persecution beginning with
state protection. 263  The first stage includes identifying "unacceptable
as a tool of the state").
256. Roland Minnerath, Church Autonomy in Europe, in CHURCH AUTONOMY 381, 391 (Gerhard
Robbers ed., 2001) (citing Greece, England, and pre-Vatican II Catholic countries); CORNELIUS D.
DE JONG, THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION OR BELIEF IN THE UNITED
NATIONS (1946-1992) 445-48 (2000) (citing Tunisia, Greece); Felix Corley, Turkmenistan:
Religious Freedom Survey April 2004, Forum 18 News Service, April 7, 2004, available at
http://www.foruml8.org/Archive.php?article-id=296 (last visited Jan. 24, 2005) (describing the
removal of the Chief Mufti by President Niyazov in January 2003).
257. Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (1999); Hasan and Chaush v.
Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55 (2000).
258. See, e.g., Rik Torfs, Church Autonomy in Belgium, in CHURCH AUTONOMY, supra note 256,
at 607, 621-23 (describing the "important impact" state financial support has on "the organizing
[sic] and financing of church activities," recognizing that "ignoring that financial support has a link
with church autonomy would be ... naive...").
259. For example, current regulation in Turkmenistan which requires "imam-hatybs to place the
Turkmen flag above mosque entrances, to begin every sermon by praising 'Turkmenbashi', 'Father
of the Turkmens', as President Saparmurat Niyazov insists on being called." Igar Rotar,
Turkmenistan: State Interference with Islamic Religious Life in the North-East, FORUM 18 NEws
SERVICE, available at http://www.foruml8.org/archive.php?article_id=268 (last visited Jan. 16,
2005). Also, a copy of Niyazov's book, the Ruhnama (Book of the Soul), must be placed at the
entrance to every mosque and Muslims must touch it as if it were a sacred object. Id. In Algeria, the
state appoints imams and removes those who oppose government policies. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
AND BELIEF, supra note 45, at 23.
260. See Stegeby, supra note 14.
261. Central Asia: Islam and the State, supra note 209.
262. See Davis, supra note 94.
263. This cycle has been documented several times throughout German history, with the most
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religions... through the granting of exclusive license to the official religion
or religions."26  Second, a state establishes a "unified position" among
"political leaders, clergy, and intellectuals... against minority groups.' '265
Third, minority religions are categorized as "rival societies rather than
religions '266 and presented as a threat to the state. Fourth, the government
legally restricts minority religions members' "movement, commerce, or the
right to bear arms. ' ' 267 Finally, the dominant religion may participate in the
"forced removal" of the minority group in the most extreme cases.
268
The stifling of minority religions not only has an impact on the minority
religions affected, but also has negative consequences for the majority
religions in a society. New religious movements often act as an indicator of
what some members of society feel is missing in their lives, and can
challenge and invigorate more traditional religions to better meet the needs
of its members.269 Christopher Eberle and Christian Smith argue that
religious pluralism vivifies religion and thus "politically active religious
citizens, and even those willing to support their favored coercive laws on the
basis of their parochial religious commitments, have a vested interest in
refusing coercively to impose their favored religious orthodoxy on a diverse
population. '270 Citing numerous other scholars, they note a "convergence of
voices, then in support of the claim that religious communities benefit from
pluralism and thus from a political regime that protects the religious freedom
from which pluralism ensues." 27' An example of why this works in practice
can be seen in the following anecdote: Bolivian Roman Catholic bishops
complained to the pope during his visit to Bolivia about the growth of
minority religions. He is reported to have responded that "these other
religious groups were nourishing the people... if [the] Pentecostals are
gaining adherents, it is because the bishops and Bolivian Catholics are not
obvious example being Hitler during World War H. id. at 112, 123. Davis quotes Pierre van
Paassen who insisted that "Hitler could never have perpetrated the Holocaust" without Germany's
"unfriendly attitude toward the Jews... and by the anti-Semitic teaching in our churches and
schools." Id. at 123.
264. Id. at 112 (internal quotations omitted).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Eileen Barker, NRMs: Their Incidence and Significance, in NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS:
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 26-28 (Bryan R. Wilson & Jamie Cresswell eds., 1999) [hereinafter
NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS]; see Guroian, supra note 229, at 243-44 (suggesting that the
Orthodox respond to the challenge of proselytism by reinvigorating itself and focusing on its
mission).
270. CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS 26-27, 44-45
(2002).
271. Id. at 45 (citing Roger Finke, Rodney Stark, Joes Casanova, and others).
doing their job. 272  In addition, when a majority church becomes a
persecutor of other religions, even if accomplished together with the state,
this may over time also undermine the powerful religious claims and the
purity and power of a religious mission of a group. 3
B. Harms of Protectionist Measures for State and Society
1. Decrease in Democracy
Historically as well as today, U.S. and international 274 commentators
reject protection of industry because it decreases democracy through
concentrating power in a few corporate hands. Early American colonists
opposed state protection and monopolies275 because they were associated
with the British monarchy rather than a new American democracy. 6  In
passing the Sherman Act, a major goal of Congress was to avoid
concentration of power,277 which caused antidemocratic harms.278 Similarly,
272. Cleary, supra note 185, at 25.
273. See, e.g., Elliott & Corrado, supra note 229, at 122 (quoting a leader of the Orthodox Church
in America as arguing that suppressive policies towards other religions in Russia would "in the long
run... have a negative impact also on the mission of the Russian Orthodox Church").
274. Internationally, experts agree that "an economic system based on private enterprise and free-
market competition best serves human goals" and that "[g]ovemment intervention-whether by
government participation in the market or by direct or indirect regulation-should occur
exceptionally and only to the minimum extent necessary to remedy serious market failure."
Hearings on Antitrust, supra note 58, at 128 (statement of Abott B. Lipsky, Jr., who served as a
member of the Special Committee on International Antitrust of the American Bar Association,
Section of Antitrust Law).
275. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADMON 36-37 (1955). Monopoly was opposed even before the Sherman Act in America due to
experiences with monopolistic privilege in England. See id. "[Sieveral colonial statutes are said to
have prohibited" monopolistic practices because of "popular antagonism to monopoly." Id.
276. Colonists felt that "monopoly was the antithesis of the very spirit of individualistic
pioneering characteristic of life on the new continent" and had been one of the main reasons
emigrants had left Great Britain in the first place. Id. at 37. Although opposition to monopoly
existed even before the Sherman Act, when the Sherman Act was first enacted it was not enforced
against "such tight combinations as holding companies and mergers." HAWLEY, supra note 32, at 6
(noting that "[ilt was not until the progressive era in the early twentieth century that major changes
in the political and ideological climate began to take place" when people began to be "increasingly
dubious.., about the doctrines of laissez faire and Social Darwinism"). For this reason, many
colonists rejected England's practice of granting "chartered trade monopolies." THORELLI, supra
note 275, at 37.
277. One major argument against monopoly from the advent of the Sherman Act and also the
consensus for "almost a century" has been the "hostility to the concentration in private hands of
power." See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (noting that "[p]ower
that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the
hands of an industrial oligarchy"); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
428 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting that "great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless
of their economic results"); Fredrick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of
Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1541 (1984) (noting that
"antitrust sought to stem a 'tide of concentration'); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1051-52 (1979) (noting that "excessive concentration of
economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures"); Harlan M. Blake, Conglomerate
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when enacting Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950, Congress worried that
an economy "dominated by a few corporate giants could.., facilitate
overthrow of democratic institutions and the installation of a totalitarian
,,279 ~ atregime. In fact, after World War II, to reconstruct former totalitarian
Germany and Japanese economies, the United States rooted out state-
controlled and protected industries and "create[d] alternative centers of
power that could not readily be marshaled behind authoritarian regimes.,
280
Politicians feared not only that citizens would lose power to influence
change with increased concentration of power but that there would be a
Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 575 (1973) (noting that the Sherman Act
was concerned with the "threat to the opportunities of individuals and smaller businessmen to
compete on an equal basis in a competitive system" with heavy concentration of economic power);
Harlan M. Blake & Wiliam K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 383 (1965)
(pointing out that "antitrust operates to forestall concentrations of economic power, which, if
allowed to develop unhindered, would call for much more intrusive government supervision of the
economy"). Some cases have linked a concentration of power over a product to make "a prima facie
case of intent and purpose to exercise illegal restraints and to monopolize." See Kobe, Inc. v.
Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 423 (10th Cir. 1952).
278. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. at 536 (stating that "[i]ndustrial power should be
decentralized... [and] should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people will
not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few
self-appointed men."). The Sherman Act also aimed to "improve the free market system" to avoid
other solutions such as Marxism or heavy government regulation. Pitofsky, supra note 277, at 1057.
279. Pitofsky, supra note 277, at 1054, 1055 (pointing out that "it is remarkable that historical and
contemporaneous democracies are almost invariably associated with market systems, while
totalitarian regimes (fascist and communist) almost always are not"). In addition, during
congressional debate over section 7 of the Clayton Act representatives pointed out that Nazi
Germany built up a great series of industrial monopolies in steel, rubber, coal and other materials.
The monopolies soon got control of Germany, brought Hitler to power and forced virtually the
whole world into war.... A high degree of concentration throughout industry fosters the formation
of cartels and readily enables a war-minded government to mobilize for hostilities... [as] the
history of war preparations in Germany [demonstrate during] both World War I and World War II.
95 CONG. REc. 11,486 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 315 (1961) ("The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950
amendments [to the Clayton Act] was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic
concentration in the American economy."). In passing the Clayton Act senators also worried that
monopoly leads to citizens "losing power to direct their own economic welfare... [and in turn the]
means to direct their political future. 96 CONG. REC. 16, 452 (1950) (statement of Senator
Kefauver); see also Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 234-37 (1960) (stating that Congressmen worried that powerful
industries would increase "government control" which would "corrode" freedom). Even in recent
cases the rejection of concentrations of power is emphasized. United States v. Syufy Enter., 903
F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1990) (pointing out that competition is important in avoiding "permanent
concentrations of economic power").
280. Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 1076, 1078 (1979) (stating that decartelization and imposing antitrust laws to root out
monopolies was one way that the United States reconstructed the German and Japanese economies
after World War I).
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decrease in "local initiative and civic responsibility" and ultimately a loss of
democratic values.281
In addition, concentration of wealth through state protection decreases
democracy since governments may not be able to control industries once
they gain too much power. While proponents of protection insist that larger
companies provide better service, governments have also come to realize
that the larger the size of the company, the more difficult it becomes for the
government to "monitor resources to keep the giant in line" 282 and deregulate
it when necessary.283
2. Social Reform, Decrease in Democracy, and Hostility
Religious protectionist practices may harm society through decreasing
social reform through minority religions and through creating hostility and
violence. First, state protectionism may stifle minority religions thereby
284 teTdecreasing social reform movements. In the United States, "religious
communities were the driving force" behind the Civil Rights Movement
which "provide[d] legal protections" to African Americans. 285  If "strict
religious registration laws" existed during this time, the government could
have deterred many in this movement under the "pretext of 'state
security.'' '286  Limiting the existence or activities of religious groups may
281. Bok, supra note 279, at 236; see also Pitofsky, supra note 277, at 1071. Several cases have
relied partly on the desire not to concentrate power into too few hands. See United States v.
Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1970) (reciting defendants' arguments
that allowing the challenged merger would increase competition for nationally influential banks and
would actually increase competition nationally); see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
282. Sheils & Cook, supra note 215, at 59. This article discusses the Justice Department's
antitrust suit against AT&T, noting that "smaller companies worry about AT&T's sheer size" and
that the government is "turning loose something with billions of dollars that can do anything it
wants ... [a]nd the FCC won't be able to do anything about it ... until the landscape is littered with
the corpses of former competitors." Id. (quoting Herbert N. Jasper, Executive Vice President of an
industry group fighting the Telecommunications Act of 1980, which was backed by AT&T) (internal
quotations omitted). In 1980, commentators did not believe that the Telecommunications Act of
1980 would pass during that year but "almost all observers predict[ed] that when a new law is finally
passed, it [would] be one that AT&T approves." Id. AT&T was held liable for restraining trade and
using "monopoly power in one market to limit competition in another market, and combin[ing] or
conspir[ing] among its units to monopolize the field." Merrill Brown, AT&T Loses $105 Million
Scrap Wire Antitrust Suit, WASH. POST, March 10, 1984, at Cl.
283. However, as many governments who allow monopolies find out, the larger the company and
more government protection, the bigger the fight the company will put up when threatened with
deregulation. See Sheils & Cook, supra note 215, at 59.
284. Roadblock to Religious Liberty: Religious Registration, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Oct. 11, 2001, 107th Cong. 3 [hereinafter Roadblock] (statement of Hon.
Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe).
285. Id. at 3; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT 891-93 (2001) (pointing out that that Southern Christian Leadership Conference "was
the force that developed the infrastructure of the civil rights movement" as well as the "moral,
material, and organizational support to local protesters, otherwise isolated and at a disadvantage with
the white power structure").
286. Roadblock, supra note 284, at 3.
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decrease democratic social reform. 287 A large body of scholarship has been
devoted to the role that religions can play as mediating structures in
promoting civil society and social reform.288 This role is not limited to
dominant religious groups. Indeed, the developments of minority religions
are often themselves an attempt to change society. A major scholar of new
religious movements, Eileen Barker, has argued that new religious
movements "may occasionally function as a barometer of what at least some
members of a society feel they need but is not being supplied by other
means," allowing new religious movements "a significant role to play as a
dissenting force in society. '2 Sg
Ultimately, protectionist arguments for religion, like those for industry,
lead to a weakening of democracy itself. The European Court of Human
Rights has articulated this concept, explaining that the "social tension" that
might arise from allowing religious splinter groups is an unavoidable effect
of pluralism, which is inseparable from democracy.290 Robert Audi explains
that governmental preferences for a particular religion undermine liberal
democracy in three ways. First, preferences based on religion violate the
libertarian principle. Government preferences of religion undermine
freedom in the choice of a religion by applying direct or indirect pressure on
its citizens to adopt the favored religion.291 Second, religious protectionism
violates equality principles, particularly significant in liberal democracy,
with its emphasis on freedom as well as basic political equality.292 "Even if
the existence of certain disproportionate powers does not necessarily (or at
least does not directly) restrict anyone's liberty, concentration of power in a
religious group as such easily impairs democracy, in which citizens should
have equal opportunities to exercise political power on a fair basis. 293
Recognizing that that many traditional democracies have some form of
religious protectionism, he notes that in such a case, even if necessary
safeguards against abuses are in place, such a system implies that "the ideal
287. Id. (noting that restrictions on religious groups "remove[s] from society forces that operate
for the general welfare").
288. See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); MARTIN E. MARTY WITH
JONATHAN MOORE, POLITICS, RELIGION AND THE COMMON GOOD (2000); J. Philip Wogaman, The
Church as Mediating Institution: Theological and Philosophical Perspective, in DEMOCRACY AND
MEDIATING STRUCTURES: A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY (Michael Novak ed., 1980); PAUL J.
WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (2002); ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS
COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000).
289. NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS, supra note 269, at 26-27.
290. Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (1999).
291. AUDI, supra note 288, at 33-35.
292. Id. at 36-37.
293. Id. at 36.
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of liberal democracy has not been fully reached, that protections of liberty
and basic political equality must be maintained in relation to the established
church, and that a rationale is needed to justify its continuance insofar as a
liberal democracy is the nation's political ideal. 294 Audi also argues that
religious preferences undermine the liberal democratic ideal of neutrality.
Neutrality can apply to both liberty concerns-equal freedom to accept or
reject all religious views-and to equality concerns-government preference
toward a religion may well create a dominant bloc of voters or polarize
government along religious lines, which undermines equalitarian
participation in government.295 Neutrality in belief can also be undermined
by government grants of special benefits upon particular qualifications,
which qualifications themselves may shape the action of religious groups.296
Finally, state protection of a religious monopoly may result in agression
or even violence toward minority religious groups. 297  Progressive
polarization of the state and a minority religion, which may happen with
increasing government protections for a dominant religion, has been
identified as an important step in leading to violent conflict between a state
and a minority religion.298 Governments can escalate the polarization by
"cultural opponents of NRMs [new religious movements] .,, 299 Although the
state action is not necessarily required to provoke violence,
it should be of considerable concern when cultural opponents are
successful in recruiting government agents in campaigns to assail
apocalyptic religious movements. With the state's monopoly on the
legitimate use of force and its expansive power to regulate social
life, minority religions are often at the mercy of the state's social
control agents. An overwhelming show of force, or a threat of
300.force, can induce acts of violence in apocalyptic groups ....
One commentator has argued that in a state with a virtual religious
monopoly, restriction of minority religious rights leads to violence.0 1 In
Israel, for example, "separate religious courts for every religious
community" and substantive laws that rely solely on Jewish principles draw
294. Id. at 37.
295. Id. at 37-39.
296. Id. at 39-40.
297. See Barker, supra note 123, at 579 (indicating violence against Jehovah's Witnesses in
Georgia, for example); see also id. at 39; MALCOLM D: EVANS, Historical Analysis of Freedom of
Religion or Belief as a Technique for Resolving Religious Conflict, in FACILITATING FREEDOM,
supra note 44, at 1; MARK JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE (3d ed., 2003).
298. David G. Bromley, Dramatic Denouements, in CULTS, RELIGION & VIOLENCE 11, 26-27
(David G. Bromley & J. Gordon Melton eds., 2002) [hereinafter CULTS, RELIGION & VIOLENCE].
299. Stuart A. Wright, Public Agency Involvement in Government-Religious Movement
Confrontations, in CULTS, RELIGION & VIOLENCE, supra note 298, at 102, 108-10.
300. Id.at lO-11.
301. S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel and Iran: How the Integration of Secular and
Spiritual Laws Affects Human Rights and the Potential for Violence, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 110-
13 (1997) (using Iran and Israel as the prime examples of religious states).
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attention to the differences in the community and create inequity between
the Jews and Muslims in the country.3"2 One scholar has suggested that
these structural inequities lead to religious minorities "perceiv[ing that]
violence [is] the only way to effectuate change in society. 3 °3 In Iran as
well, the violent 1979 Islamic Revolution was partly justified by a religious
minority whose rights of worship were constrained under the secular rule of
Shah Pahlavi. 304 Not only can state protection of dominant religions lead to
violence by minority religions but it may accompany violence against
minority groups. In Russia, the anti-extremism legislation adopted to allow
liquidation of some nontraditional religions, was instituted "shortly after the
widespread appearance of booby-trapped anti-Semitic signs., 30 5  The anti-
extremism legislation was spurred by "increasing ranks of nationalist,
fascist, and other intolerant groups that attribute Russia's present economic
and social ills to ethnic and national minorities. ' '306  Just as industrial
protection may decrease democracy, religious protection may also decrease
democracy and in extreme circumstances create hostility and violence.
C. Harms of Protectionist Measures for Citizens
1. Decreased Individual Liberty
Among industries and religions, harms to citizens result from lack of
individual choice due to limits on foreign and domestic competition. Anti-
monopoly legislation and bans of other protectionist measures are intended
to encourage "individual liberty" for a consumer. 307 They also encourage
302. Id. at 214-215.
303. id. at 215, 217. Strong concludes that
[i]f the goal is to create more peaceful and rights-oriented societies, one group cannot
have total control over the definition of culture and the amount of religio-legal integration
in the State; to do so will inspire permanent division in society and perpetuate violent
power struggles between groups as repressed minorities attempt to find a way to gain the
respect they need and deserve.
Id. The religious minorities may feel that they are justified to use violence to obtain rights "already
established under international law," like "nondiscrimination on the basis of religion." Id. at 203
(pointing out that violent religious minorities may claim that they "are pursuing rights that are not
currently recognized in law or theory but are a logical extension thereof and that violence is
necessary to force the State to recognize these new types of rights").
304. Id. at 131, 164.
305. Gross, supra note 128, at 718. The legislation "gained additional momentum following the
June 2002 soccer riots.., that ended in ... vandalism of cars and Japanese restaurants, and racial
violence, including assaults on five Japanese students." Id. at 719.
306. Id. at718-19.
307. Blake & Jones, supra note 277, at 384 (pointing out that an "individual who wants to be an
entrepreneur rather than an employee ought not to have his range of opportunities restricted by
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diversity of individual choices. 30 8  Likewise, state protection of religion
lessens individual liberty, human rights, and liberal democracy. 30 9 In many
international and U.S. laws, religious freedom has been declared as a
"fundamental right of every individual. 31 ° International norms also protect
against state discrimination in the protection of fundamental rights, such as
freedom of religion.311  Not only does state protection violate the
fundamental right to freedom of religion, but prohibitions on religious
competition may also constrain citizens' freedom of association or freedom
of speech rights.31 2 Both industrial and religious protection results in a lack
of individual liberty, which in the religious arena may constitute a violation
of a fundamental right.
2. Availability and Service
State protection of industrial monopolies may actually decrease
availability of services for citizens. Today, although pressure to "impose
protectionist measures" may be intense,313 most industrialized countries
agree that "open competition was the best way to achieve greater enhanced
unnecessary barriers to entry or by trade practices designed specifically to eliminate him from the
field").
308. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Competition...
promotes diversity, giving consumers choices to fit a wide array of personal preferences.").
309. For a fuller discussion of the relation between protection of dominant religions and a
weakening of liberal democracy, see supra text accompanying notes 290-96.
310. See Annual Report 2003, supra note 99, at 1; see also International Religious Freedom Act
of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (2000). In addition, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights holds that "[elveryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance," which is reiterated in Article 18 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [hereinafter European Convention]. Stahnke also provides a
thorough discussion of how limitations on the right to proselyte violate international human rights
law. Stahnke, supra note 45, at 624-25.
311. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2(1), 26; European Convention,
supra note 310, Art. 14. This protection extends against governmental discrimination in "any field
regulated and protected by public authorities." S.W.M. Broeks v. The Netherlands, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., Comm. No. 172/1984, 1 12.3 (April 9, 1987), available at http://wwwserver.law.
wits.ac.za/humanrts/undocs/session42/172-1984.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005); U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen. Comment No. 22(48) on Art. 18, 1 12 (July 20, 1993), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcomm22.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
312. Metro. Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R.
13 (2001) (finding overlapping rights to freedom of association and freedom of religion in the
establishment of a legal entity); Roadblock, supra note 284, at 3 (statement of Hon. Christopher H.
Smith, Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe); see also
Sidiropoulos v. Greece, App. No. 57/1997/841/1047, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 633, 40 (1998) ("That
citizens should be able to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is
one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of association, without which that right
would be deprived of any meaning.").
313. Jeanne Asherman, The International Monetary Fund: A History of Compromise, 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 235,304 (1984).
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services. 3t4  Most policymakers no longer contend that state-controlled
public monopolies benefit consumers.31 5
Less developed countries still claim that they should be entitled to some
state protection to provide "basic service" to their residents. 16 Some
commentators agree that developing countries are entitled to protectionist
measures such as import barriers and subsidies to be able to compete with
industrialized countries.3 17 However, often this same argument is made with
countries protecting struggling religions arguing that the state should protect
former dominant religions that are now struggling. Particularly in post-
Communist Europe, leaders of dominant religions argue that their
denomination is "in a weakened condition and need[s] time to regain its
strength after seventy years of Soviet rule." '318
Even if commentators justify industrial protection for less developed
countries, they cannot similarly justify protection of religion. Protection of
religion cannot be justified in the same sense because religious freedom is
not a matter of economic policy that states can differ on, but a human right
recognized in most state constitutions and numerous international
agreements." 9  Although commentators may be able to justify state
314. Lando, supra note 50, at 2185.
315. Id. at 2197 (noting that "monopolistic control by PTIs [Postal Telegraph and
Telecommunications Administrations] does not benefit telecommunications users .... ").
316. Id. at 2185. Less developed countries often still insist that a public monopoly is the best way
of providing "basic service" to their residents. Id. These countries fear the open competition will
result in companies "enhancing service on the existing hard-wire lines" and "neglecting the less
profitable laying of more wires... leaving some residents with no service at all." Id. at 2185. Some
commentators have supported developing countries employing protectionist measures for infant
industries, but not for dying industries in developed countries. Asherman, supra note 313, at 304
n.353.
317. Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-
Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO's Future, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 608, 612 n.10
(2000) (arguing that developing countries should "retain more discretion to promote 'infant
industries' and other policies through subsidies and import barriers than under WTO rules"); General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5-6, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, Art. XVIII (legitimizing the infant industry argument); Kevin C. Kennedy, A Review
of Globalization and its Discontents, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 251, 258 (2003) (noting that
developing countries have used GATT Art. XVIII to justify protectionist measures).
318. Guroian, supra note 229, at 231 (citing Armenian Orthodox leaders).
319. Although some commentators might argue that religious "protection" may be in the eye of
the beholder, they may point out that European, Eastern, and Eastern Christian religions focus more
on "group rights" than individual rights. Payne, supra note 87, at 263. Therefore, instead of
considering "the right of religious freedom... [as] the right of the individual to believe as he or she
desires, but rather it is the freedom of the church to exist[:]" This is why proselytism by minority
churches is often outlawed by these countries. Id. (pinpointing Greece as an example of this
phenomenon with its anti-proselytism legislation). Regardless of whether a country claims to be
protecting "group rights," granting advantages to certain religions still violates non-discrimination
principles established by international agreements. There are also several international agreements
recognizing the importance of freedom of religion.
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protectionism of industry with less developed countries, allowing state
protection of religion is less defensible.
The similarities between the arguments made by industrial and religious
monopolies for state protection are remarkable. Although many arguments
are similar, dominant religions also express several unique arguments in
favor of state protection. The next section explores the acute interests made
in the case of religious protection.
VI. MORE ACUTE INTERESTS IN CASE OF RELIGION
Religious monopolies often justify state protection with acute interests
in protecting citizens. Religions claim that state protection is necessary to
allow citizens to be inculcated with moral values, retain a sense of
community and place, and recognize proper social roles.
A. Inculcation of Moral Values
States often allow a dominant religion to teach moral values to society,
especially in places where religion has been absent from public life. A
reason for state protection of a dominant religion in some Eastern European
countries may be to fill a "spiritual vacuum" in a society and in general to
raise the "moral level" of the citizenry. In Greece, the Orthodox Church
views its role in society as preserving the national identity of the Greek
people, including their religious faith.321 In Denmark, religion is such a vital
part of the culture that educators rely on religious teachings of the Danish
National Church to familiarize students with "fundamental values in Danish
culture. 322 Other state churches are legally obligated to teach morals of the
dominant religion in state schools.323 Norway used to require the teaching of
the doctrine of the Church of Norway to improve the morals of the students,
but eventually determined that this could be done without a more inclusive
religious message.324
B. Community and Place
Many dominant churches identify a community of followers over which
they have fellowship, which may include citizens who are nonbelievers. In
320. Schlafly, supra note 38, at 135 (citations omitted). Schlafly cites studies showing that in
Russia, "although 75 percent of Russians are baptized and 50 percent consider themselves Orthodox,
only 5 percent go to church more than once a month and only 10 percent confess and communicate
at least once a year." Id.
321. Payne, supra note at 87, at 266; see supra note 3 and accompanying text for discussion of
how the Greek Orthodox Church is the dominant religion in Greece.
322. Dubeck, supra note 87, at 48; see supra note 155 and accompanying text for discussion of
the Danish National Church as the state church of Denmark.
323. See, e.g., Canas, supra note 71, at 272-73 (pointing out that in Portugal state churches must
allow "Catholic morals and religion" to be taught "by the church in some state schools" because it is
the "major Church").
324. Inge Eidsv~g et al., The Emergence of Interfaith Dialogue: The Norwegian Experience, in
FACILITATING FREEDOM, supra note 44, at 777-79, 785-86.
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many countries, the center of community and culture has been and remains
the dominant church. 325 Dominant churches may insist on identifying their
members to the public in an effort to solidify a community of followers.326
Through creating a united community of worshippers a dominant church
justifies its place as the "prevailing religion in the land. 327  Leaders of
dominant religions, in Spain for example, reject state legislation and
constitutional referendums that fail to promote Catholic religious values and
fail to mention "God or Catholic values" because of perceived harms to their
community. The Catholic Church in Spain rejects all state documents that
are "an attempt to foist an agnostic constitution on a nation of the
baptized., 328  Part of maintaining the "dignity and personality" of a
community of followers may include actively opposing proselytism by
minority religions.329  Russian Orthodox leaders consider the Orthodox
Church a community "to which even its unchurched sons and daughters
rightfully belong. 33 °  Protecting religion is often seen as a means of
protecting cultural integrity, particularly in African communities that were
subject to proselytizing as part of colonization.33'
C. Social Roles
Religious monopolies claim they benefit society by promoting
appropriate social roles through preserving the faith of the citizens. Some
states, like Ireland, recognize the dominant church as a "guardian of the
325. Canas, supra note 71, at at 271 (claiming that "[f]or centuries the Catholic Church has been
one of the most important cent[ers] of culture (and until the last century probably the only one)").
326. Mavrogordatos, supra note 5, at 122 ("Until recently, birth certificates, compulsory identity
cards, and other official records in Greece routinely included religious affiliation: Christian
Orthodox for almost 97 per cent [sic] of Greek citizens.") (internal quotations omitted).
327. Id. (internal quotations omitted). This practice was outlawed in May 2000 and the Greek
Orthodox Church "apparently perceived this move as a first step in the gradual erosion of its
institutional monopoly, and refused to accept it." Id.
328. Anderson, supra note 5, at 141 (describing comments of Cardinal Martin of the Catholic
Church in response to constitutional clauses that "left the door open for the introduction of divorce
legislation").
329. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, at 34 (1994) (citing the
Greek government which forbids proselytism and "attache[s] a criminal penalty to this prohibition"
in Article 13 of the 1975 Constitution); see, e.g., JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, THE REPRESSION
OF EVANGELISM IN GREECE: EUROPEAN LITIGATION VIS-A-VIS A CLOSED RELIGIOUS
ESTABLISHMENT 24, 655, 99, 135 (2001) (discussing the "Athens Three" case where charges of
proselytism led to a fine of 50,000 drachmas "as pecuniary satisfaction for moral damage which she
suffered" and noting that the "main aim of the [anti-proselytism] legislation, as applied in practice is
to protect the dominant religion ... to the detriment of all other faiths").
330. Schlafly, supra note 38, at 137.
331. Mutua, supra note 234.
Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens. '3 32 This recognition is
not just in name but has been relied on in an Irish Supreme Court decision
granting custody over a child to the mother "because she was a Catholic
rather than to the father, who was a Protestant., 333 To be raised to fulfill his
proper social roles, the Court reasoned that he required a Catholic
upbringing. Similarly, the dominant church in Greece, the Orthodox Church
is viewed as the "protector of the collective tradition and the way of life of
the nation. 334 In addition, dominant religions place emphasis on educating
children in the tenets of the dominant religion in schools.335
The similarities between the arguments made by industries and religion
relying on state protection are remarkable, despite a few acute interests
expressed only by religious monopolies.
VII. CONCLUSION: COMMODIFICATION OF RELIGION
Religious monopolies receive protectionist legislation through asserting
benefits to religion, state and society, and citizens. Industries and religious
groups claim benefits including better service, preserving social stability and
national security for state and society and protection of citizens from fraud.
The remarkable similarity between the arguments for protection of industry
and religion demonstrate that protectionist arguments in the religion context
treat religion like a garden variety market commodity. Even if it is
appropriate to treat religion in the same way as industry, the asserted
benefits of state protection of industry have been broadly discredited in other
contexts, suggesting that the same arguments should be viewed skeptically
in the religious context.
While some state protection of religious monopolies may not officially
violate religious freedom under international law,336 this article has tried to
332. Kissane, supra note 5, at 77 (describing Ireland's Article 44.1.2 referring to the "Holy
Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church") (internal quotations omitted).
333. Id. at 77.
334. Payne, supra note 87, at 269.
335. In Greece, the religious instruction is only in the Orthodox faith. Mavrogordatos, supra note
5, at 121. The Council of State (the Greek Supreme Court) "ruled unconstitutional a reduction in the
hours of religious instruction in the schools." Id.
336. See the discussion of this point in W. Cole Durham, Jr., Freedom of Religion or Belief.: Laws
Affecting the Structuring of Religious Communities (1999), available at
http:/lwww.osce.orglodihrl1999/09/1502_en.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2005). Violations under the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (U.S. law based on international treaties and
agreements) include:
(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for-
i. assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and
prayer, including arbitrary registration requirements;
ii. speaking freely about one's religious beliefs;
iii. changing one's religious beliefs and affiliation;
iv. possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or
v. raising one's children in the religious teachings and practices of one's choice;
OR
(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual's religious belief
or practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced
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show how the arguments for protection made by religious and industrial
monopolies are often unconvincing.337 In fact not only are these arguments
suspect, state protection may actually harm the three constituents they aim to
benefit. Protection of industry and religion may lead to a weaker industry or
religion, a decrease in democracy, and limits on individual freedom. State
protection of religion, which is more harmful than protection of industry,
may degrade the liberty of citizens, undermine the autonomy and vibrancy
of all religions, and allow oppression by dominant religions. Democracy
and liberty are two of the key values that underlie the arguments against
economic protectionism, and are also the values most threatened by religious
attempts at protectionism. Since the "manner in which a society" protects
freedom of religion is the true "litmus test of its commitment to human
rights," 38 perhaps it is time that a more critical eye be focused upon the
arguments made in the apologetics of religious protectionism.
labor, forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating,
torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution.
22 U.S.C. § 6402(13)(A)-(B); see also Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF:
ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION (1996) (providing a thorough discussion
of international norms protecting freedom of religion and belief).
337. For further discussion see discussion supra Parts fl-B, III-B, and IV-B.
338. Arzt, supra note 70, at 378; see NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS, supra note 269, at 28.
If one had to select one criterion that might indicate the extent to which a society was
"open" or "closed," the legal position of NRMs [new religious movements] would be a
not altogether ridiculous choice. For somewhat finer tuning, the second criterion could
well be the legal treatment of NRMs.
Id. at 28.
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